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ICROSOFI'S well-publicized legal troubles with antitrust au-
thorities, both in the United States and in Europe,' have fo-
cused attention on interoperability 2 and access issues that often
arise in high technology network industries. Because of the importance
of these industries in the United States and global economies, 3 antitrust
problems arising from them have particular economic and social impact.
This reality has re-ignited a simmering debate on "essential facilities," a
doctrine that has had a long, if somewhat controversial, history in U.S.
antitrust law.
Generally seen as originating in the Supreme Court's 1912 Terminal
Railroad4 decision, the essential facilities doctrine holds that a dominant
firm's refusal to grant access to a facility it controls, which is necessary for
competition and infeasible to replicate, may give rise to antitrust liabil-
ity.5 In the days of Terminal Railroad, the denial of access usually per-
tained to a physical asset, such as railroad bridges or pipelines. But the
same legal and economic principles are equally applicable even if the "fa-
cility" is information or some other intangible asset. Thus, the doctrine
can also be effective in redressing competitive problems caused by the
* Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. Email: Marina.Lao@shu.
edu. I thank Professor Paul Rogers and the SMU Law Review for inviting me to partici-
pate in this symposium. I am also indebted to Charles Sullivan for his always thoughtful
comments and insights and to Brandon Peene (Seton Hall '10) for his superb research
assistance.
1. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 46 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (finding
Microsoft's conduct violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act); Case T-201/04, Microsoft
Corp. v. Comm'n, 2007 WL 2693858 (Sept. 17, 2007) [hereinafter CFI Microsoft Judg-
ment] (finding Microsoft's acts constituted abuse of dominant position, in violation of Arti-
cle 82 of the EC Treaty).
2. "Interoperability" generally means the "ability of a system ... to work with or use
the parts or equipment of another system." Merriam Webster Online Dictionary, http://
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/interoperability (last visited Feb. 20, 2009).
3. NAT'L Sci. BD., 1 SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING INDICATORS 2008, at 6-5 (2008),
available at http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind08/pdf/volumel.pdf (providing economic
data on high technology industries).
4. United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383, 409 (1912).
5. See infra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
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lack of access or interoperability in modern network industries.6
Access issues may arise in modem networks when monopolists control-
ling critical technical information refuse to license that information to
competitors, usually in secondary (or complementary) markets. 7 This de-
prives consumers of some of the positive "network effects," or demand-
side economies of scale, often generated by networks. 8 They also fore-
close competition in the complements, leaving consumers with little
choice but to use the monopolist's complement.9
Few would disagree that this outcome is harmful to consumers. The
difficult issue, though, is whether there is a principled and theoretically
sound basis for antitrust intervention. I suggest that there is-the essen-
tial facilities doctrine, cautiously applied. The doctrine has endured harsh
criticism from commentators for years,10 though a handful of strong dis-
senting voices have recently been heard.11 The Supreme Court has also
made a point of diminishing the legitimacy of the doctrine in dicta in
2004.12
Critics contend, in part, that the doctrine is not theoretically grounded
and lacks a consistent rationale.' 3 An examination of the key essential
facilities cases in U.S. antitrust jurisprudence suggests, however, that this
critique is undeserved. Though these cases are somewhat underthe-
orized, they are in fact based on sound, if unarticulated, principles.1 4
6. See infra Part IV.
7. See infra Part II.
8. See infra notes 30-38 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., 3A PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 771c
(2d ed. 2002) (describing the doctrine as "harmful," "unnecessary," and "should be aban-
doned"); Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58
ANTITRUST L.J. 841, 852-53 (1989) (criticizing the doctrine as fundamentally flawed);
Michael Boudin, Antitrust Doctrine and the Sway of Metaphor, 75 GEO. L.J. 395, 397-403
(1986); Richard J. Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, An Economic Analysis of Unilateral Refusals to
License Intellectual Property, 93 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sci. 12749, 12754 (1996), available at
http://pnas.org/cgi/reprint/93/23/12749.pdf (making the argument that compulsory licensing
of intellectual property is equivalent to the essential facilities doctrine, which is not welfare
enhancing); Keith N. Hylton, Economic Rents and Essential Facilities, 1991 BYU L. REV.
1243, 1244-45; Abbott B. Lipsky & J. Gregory Sidak, Essential Facilities, 51 STAN. L. REv.
1187, 1248 (1999) (criticizing the doctrine for lacking any coherent rationale); David Mc-
Gowan, Regulating Competition in the Information Age: Computer Software as an Essential
Facility Under the Sherman Act, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENr. L.J. 771, 850-51 (1996); Greg-
ory J. Werden, The Law and Economics of the Essential Facility Doctrine, 32 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 433 (1987).
11. See generally Brett Frischmann & Spencer Weber Waller, Revitalizing Essential
Facilities, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (2008) (proposing an "infrastructure theory" to revitalize
the doctrine); Robert Pitofsky, Donna Patterson & Jonathan Hooks, The Essential Facili-
ties Doctrine Under U.S. Antitrust Law, 70 ANTrrRusT L.J. 443 (2002) (defending the doc-
trine); Spencer Weber Waller, Areeda, Epithets, and Essential Facilities, 2008 Wis. L. REV.
359 (responding to Areeda's criticisms of essential facilities).
12. See Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
410-11 (2004) (referring to the essential facilities doctrine as having been "crafted by some
lower courts," and claiming that the Supreme Court has "never recognized such a doctrine,
and we find no need either to recognize it or to repudiate it").
13. See supra note 10; see also infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
14. See infra Parts III.A and III.B.
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Their outcomes tend to show that where a facility has natural monopoly
characteristics or strong network effects and access creates or facilitates
competition in a necessity, courts have generally applied the doctrine. 15
When those features are missing, they have rejected it. In other words,
contrary to general perception, the decisions can be viewed as rooted in
principles that are not only defensible, but eminently sensible.
These same principles can apply equally well to cases involving denial
of access to information needed for interoperability, so as to distinguish
between those cases for which application of the doctrine would be
proper and those for which it would not.16 This method would be more
effective than treating refusals to supply interoperability information as a
separate category of conduct, as the European Commission seems to rec-
ommend,17 since incompatibility does not cause similar consumer or eco-
nomic effects in all markets. I will draw on the familiar stories of
Microsoft's antitrust problems in Europe and Apple's iPod/iTunes contro-
versy to illustrate this point. 18
In addition to the contention that the essential facilities doctrine is the-
oretically infirm, there are two other main criticisms of the doctrine that
this Article will address: first, that compulsory access would not improve
consumer welfare because the "harm" it seeks to remedy-monopoly
leveraging-has no economic significance; and second, that application of
the doctrine deters innovation which is considered particularly problem-
atic in the intellectual property area. 19
Part II below reviews the importance of modern day network indus-
tries, their defining characteristics, and their antitrust implications with
respect to interoperability and access issues. It suggests that the tradi-
tional essential facilities doctrine lends itself well to addressing these is-
sues in limited circumstances. Parts III.A and III.B rebut the notion that
the doctrine lacks theoretical grounding by revisiting the traditional U.S.
essential facilities cases to identify their common, if unarticulated, under-
lying principles. Part III.C discusses the status of U.S. law on the applica-
bility of the doctrine to intellectual property rights. In Part IV, lessons
drawn from the traditional essential facilities cases are applied to inter-
operability issues found in modern day network industries, focusing on
the E.U. case against Microsoft and the iPod/iTunes controversy as illus-
trations. Finally, Part V addresses some of the objections raised about
the doctrine.
15. See infra Part III.B.
16. See infra Part IV.
17. See EUROPEAN COMM'N, DG COMPETITION DISCUSSION PAPER ON THE APPLICA-
TION OF ARTICLE 82 OF THE TREATY TO EXCLUSIONARY ABUSES § 9.2.3 (2005), available
at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf [hereinafter EC Dis-
cussion Paper]; see also infra note 185.
18. See infra Parts IV.A and IV.B.
19. See infra Part V.A and V.B.
2009]
SMU LAW REVIEW
II. NETWORK INDUSTRIES AND ANTITRUST
The central role of network industries in today's economy cannot be
overstated. High technology industries are the engines of growth in the
United States and the developed world,20 and many such industries, such
as telecommunications, computers, and the Internet, are based on net-
works or have network-like properties.2 ' Other key industries based on
networks also often provide the infrastructure or other necessities in our
modern society.2 2 A few obvious examples include transportation sys-
tems (for example, railroads, airlines, subways); banking and finance (for
example, ATMs and credit/debit card systems); news and entertainment
(for example, broadcasting and cable TV), basic public services (for ex-
ample, electricity generation and distribution), and others.2 3 Given the
importance of networks to the fabric of society, competition problems
arising in them can have extensive economic and social consequences.
The term "network" essentially describes a system made up of comple-
mentary "nodes" and "links," so that goods or services delivered by the
system require the use of two or more network components.24 The defin-
ing characteristic of network industries is the increasing value of their
products to users as the number of users increases, a phenomenon called
"network effects" or demand-side economies of scale.25 Network effects
can arise directly or indirectly.26 Direct effects refer to the increased util-
20. See supra note 3.
21. See Nicholas Economides, Public Policy in Network Industries, in HANDBOOK OF
ANTITRUST ECONoMIcs 471 (Paolo Buccirossi ed., 2007), available at http://www.stern.nyu/
networks/Economides PublicPolicyInNetworkIndustries.pdf (defining networks as be-
ing "composed of complementary nodes and links"). The ordinary dictionary meaning of
"network" simply refers to any "interconnected or interrelated chain, group, or system."
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/network
(last visited Feb. 20, 2008).
22. I use the term "infrastructure" in its ordinary dictionary meaning, to refer to "the
underlying foundation or basic framework" of a society, Merriam-Webster Online Diction-
ary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/infrastructure (last visited Feb. 20, 2009),
and not as it was used in Professors Brett Frischmann and Spencer Waller's pioneering
work on "infrastructure theory." See Frischmann & Waller, supra note 11, at 11.
23. See Economides, supra note 21, at 469.
24. See Nicholas Economides, The Economics of Networks, 14 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG.
673, 673-74 (1996) ("Formally, networks are composed of links that connect nodes. It is
inherent in the structure of a network that many components of a network are required for
the provision of a typical service. Thus, network components are complementary to each
other.").
25. See Economides, supra note 21, at 472 ("A common and defining feature of net-
work industries is the fact that they exhibit increasing returns to scale in consumption,
commonly called network effects.... A market exhibits network effects (or network exter-
nalities) when the value to a buyer of an extra unit is higher when more units are sold,
everything else being equal."); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities,
Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 424 (1985) (providing, as an ex-
ample, a telephone and explaining that the utility of a phone depends on the number of
other houses and businesses that have become part of the telephone network); Mark A.
Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L.
REV. 479, 488-500 (1998) (viewing networks as falling on a continuum that can be divided
into what the authors describe as actual networks, virtual networks, and simple positive
feedback phenomena).
26. See, e.g., Katz & Shapiro, supra note 25, at 424.
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ity that comes directly from having a greater number of interconnections
as a result of more users.27 The more people who own telephones or fax
machines, for example, the more valuable my telephone or fax machine is
to me as I can use it to reach more people. Indirect network effects de-
scribe the increased value derived from having more supporting comple-
ments developed for that product as the number of users increases. 28 The
Windows operating system that runs my computer, for example, has more
value to me (independent of its intrinsic value) as more people use it,
because more applications are then written for it, which attracts even
more users and so on.29
Network effects, then, can be efficient because they reflect economies
of scale on the demand side 3 0-the greater the number of users in a net-
work, the greater the benefits every user receives. However, since the
key reason for network effects is complementarity, 31 it logically follows
that these positive effects can be realized only to the extent that there is
interoperability. For complex products, interoperability usually requires
conformance to a standard that allows the various system components
and complements to effectively work together.32
All this has implications for antitrust law. Because of network effects,
markets tend to "tip" toward a "winner-take-all" (or "winner-take-
most") scenario, where a single standard emerges to control the market,33
just as Windows became the de facto operating system standard for
PCs. 34 If this product or standard is a critical link for complements, then
a monopolist controlling the link has the ability to foreclose competition
27. See Economides, supra note 21, at 472 ("In a traditional network, network exter-
nalities arise because a typical subscriber can reach more subscribers in a larger net-
work."); Lemley & McGowan, supra note 25, at 488-89.
28. See Economides, supra note 21, at 475 ("An extra customer yields indirect exter-
nalities to other customers, by increasing the demand for components of types A and B.");
David J. Teece & Mary Coleman, The Meaning of Monopoly: Antitrust Analysis in High-
Technology Industries, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 801, 814 (1998) ("[T]he more users of a given
[computer operating] platform, the more complementary goods that will likely be supplied
to that platform. This will lower the cost or increase the value of the platform.").
29. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 20 (D.D.C. 1999) (stating
that Windows enjoys positive network effects because its large installed base encourages
independent software vendors to write applications for Windows, making it even more
attractive to consumers); see also Lemley & McGowan, supra note 25, at 491-94 (discussing
operating systems and other examples of indirect network effects, or virtual networks);
Gregory J. Werden, Network Effects and Conditions of Entry: Lessons from the Microsoft
Case, 69 ANrITRUST L.J. 87, 93-94 (2001).
30. Economists often describe network effects as exhibiting "increasing returns to
scale in production." See Economides, supra note 21, at 471.
31. Id. at 474 ("The key reason for the appearance of network externalities is the com-
plementarity among network components.").
32. See id. at 480. A familiar example involves software application programs.
Software applications must be written to the "application program interfaces" exposed by
Windows to be able to communicate its function commands to the operating system (to
work). See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
33. See CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC
GUIDE TO THE NETWORK ECONOMY 175-76 (1999) (explaining that when multiple firms
compete in a market where there is strong positive feedback, "the strong get stronger and
the weak get weaker," and the market tends to "tip" in favor of one player).
34. See Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 13.
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in the complements by denying access to the link. This can be done by a
straightforward refusal to interconnect if actual interconnection is re-
quired, such as where a local telephone monopolist refuses to connect
long distance competitors to its local "switch," thereby preventing the
completion of long distance calls.35 More often, though, access is denied
through the creation of a proprietary interface and the refusal by the mo-
nopolist to disclose technical information regarding that interface to ri-
vals.36 Without that information, rivals are unable to ensure the
interoperability of their complements with the monopolist's primary
product or component. 37 This, in turn, enables the monopolist to lever-
age its monopoly power in one market into secondary markets.38
A decision by a monopolist to withhold interoperability information,
then, can have significant anticompetitive effects. Because a larger net-
work creates greater network effects, a monopolist's choice to exclude
rivals and limit the network by preventing interoperability essentially
reduces the demand-side economies of scale that consumers would other-
wise enjoy.39 Such a decision to deny access can also impede innovation
and competition in the complementary markets, as rivals lack the neces-
sary input-interoperability information-to create a viable alternative
complement.40 Combined with a closed network system, network effects
can, therefore, effectively create or reinforce existing entry barriers, insu-
late the monopolist from competition, and lock consumers into the ex-
isting technology,41 at least until a far superior product is developed that
can overcome these significant entry barriers.
From an economic perspective, this is clearly not an optimal outcome.
Consumer welfare would seem to be better served by a system of open
standards and full interoperability, assuming that reining in the dominant
firm would not so chill innovation as to result in a net welfare loss, as
some fear.4 2 Ideally, the law should intervene, cautiously and in limited
35. See, e.g., MCI Commc'ns Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983); see also
infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., CFI Microsoft Judgment, supra note 1.
37. See id. 58.
38. See id. [ 67.
39. See Economides, supra note 21, at 480 (explaining that "[d]ifferent firms con-
forming to the same technical standard can create a larger network effect," but a firm
choosing incompatibility would keep all the network effects, which would be smaller, to
itself); John E. Kwoka, Networks and Natural Monopoly, in NETWORK ACCESS, REGULA-
TION AND ANTITRUST 19-20 (Diana Moss ed., 2005) (arguing that the division of consumers
between two or more networks may reduce the total demand-side effects for consumers).
40. See Comm'n of European Cmtys., Comm'n Decision of 24.03.2004, Relating to a
Proceeding Under Article 82 of the EC Treaty (Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft), COM
(2004) 900 Final (Apr. 21, 2004) [hereinafter EC Microsoft Decision], 547-58, available
at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/en.pdf.
41. See CFI Microsoft Judgment, supra note 1, [ 649-658; see also Carl Shapiro, Ex-
clusivity in Network Industries, 7 GEo. MASON L. REV. 673, 675 (1999).
42. See, e.g., AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, $ 773a (expressing the concern
that decreasing the monopolist's profit by forced sharing may decrease the ex ante incen-
tive to invest and chill innovation); Mats A. Bergman, When Should an Incumbent Be
Obliged to Share Its Infrastructure with an Entrant Under the General Competition Rules?, 5
J. IND. COMP. & TRADE 5, 19-20 (2005).
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cases, to prevent a monopolist from using its control over interoperability
information to impair competition and hurt consumers in secondary mar-
kets by refusing to license or disclose that information. The question is
whether there is a sound conceptual underpinning for an antitrust
solution.
I believe there is. Despite the ridicule that has been heaped on it in
recent years by the Supreme Court43 and many commentators, 44 the es-
sential facilities doctrine can be a useful tool in ensuring open access and
interoperability. A core critique of the doctrine is that it lacks a sound
theoretical basis.45 A re-examination of the historical cases reveals, how-
ever, that this criticism is unwarranted or, at least, exaggerated. Common
themes do underlie and explain these seemingly ad hoc decisions,46 and
can provide a principled basis for applying the doctrine to resolve access
problems recurring in today's network industries.
III. THE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE
A. KEY DECISIONS AND GENERAL STATUS OF DOCTRINE IN U.S.
ANTITRUST LAW
The U.S. Supreme Court has never explicitly invoked the essential fa-
cilities doctrine by name,47 but three cases are generally cited as having
applied it.48 In all three cases, the Court decided that a defendant's de-
nial of access to a facility that it controlled and that was necessary for
competition violated the antitrust laws. In the 1912 Terminal Railroad
decision, 49 the Court required a group of railroad companies that jointly
owned the only railroad bridge across the Mississippi River leading into
and out of St. Louis to grant competing railroads access to the bridge on
equal and non-discriminatory terms. 50 In 1945 in Associated Press,51 the
Court directed a news network to open its membership on non-discrimi-
natory terms to rival newspapers that competed with the organization's
43. See Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
410-11 (2004) (dismissively referring to the essential facilities doctrine as a creation of the
lower courts and denying that the Supreme Court had ever recognized it).
44. See supra note 10.
45. See, e.g., Areeda, supra note 10, at 841 (criticizing the lack of consistent rationale
for the doctrine and describing it as "less a doctrine than an epithet"); Lipsky & Sidak,
supra note 10, at 1248 (complaining of the lack of coherent rationale for the doctrine);
Daniel E. Troy, Note, Unclogging the Bottleneck: A New Essential Facilities Doctrine, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 441, 444 (1983) (contending that the doctrine lacks principled
consistency).
46. See infra Part III-B.
47. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 410-11. The fact that no Supreme Court case had invoked
the doctrine by name probably gave the Court the opportunity to distance itself from the
doctrine in Trinko.
48. See Areeda, supra note 10, at 841-53 (discussing the Supreme Court cases out of
which the essential facilities doctrine is said to arise); Frischmann & Waller, supra note 11,
at 6-8 (same); Waller, supra note 11, at 359-66 (same); see also infra notes 49-54 and accom-
panying text.
49. United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
50. Id. at 411-13.
51. See generally Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
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existing members. 52 In Otter Tail,53 the Supreme Court condemned as an
antitrust violation a regulated power company's refusal to "wheel" elec-
trical power from its competitors through its transmission lines to munici-
palities that wanted to buy from the lower priced power companies. 54
The standard statement of the doctrine, however, was set forth, not in
these three Supreme Court decisions, but in the Seventh Circuit's 1983
MCI55 opinion. The case involved MCI's attempt to compete with AT&T
in the long-distance telephone market prior to the 1984 divestiture of the
old AT&T Bell System. 56 At that time, AT&T had monopolies in both
long-distance and local telephone service markets but, with the develop-
ment of new technologies, competition in the long-distance market be-
came possible. 57 MCI had the requisite technology but, in order to
successfully offer long distance service, it had to be able to interconnect
with AT&T's "local loop" or "last mile" of wire to reach the millions of
households and commercial establishments with telephones. 58 MCI al-
leged that AT&T's unjustified refusal to provide the necessary intercon-
nection for its long distance calls violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 59
In affirming liability based on the essential facilities doctrine, the Sev-
enth Circuit set forth its conditions: a showing that 1) the monopolist con-
trols access to an essential facility; 2) the facility cannot be reasonably
duplicated; 3) the monopolist has denied access; and 4) it was feasible for
the monopolist to share the facility.60 Implicit in the opinion was an addi-
tional condition that other cases later made explicit: that the monopolist
lacked legitimate justification for its refusal to provide access. 61
Following MCI, lower courts widely endorsed the doctrine 62 but actual
plaintiff verdicts were rare.63 Of the handful of lower court cases that
actually found for the plaintiff based on the doctrine, the best known and
most controversial is probably the 1984 Tenth Circuit Aspen Skiing deci-
sion.64 In Aspen Skiing, the defendant controlled three of four ski moun-
tains in Aspen, Colorado, and the plaintiff controlled the fourth.65 The
52. Id. at 18-19.
53. See generally Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
54. Id. at 382.
55. See generally MCI Commc'ns Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983).
56. Id. at 1093-97.
57. Id. at 1092-94.
58. See id. at 1132.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1132-33.
61. See, e.g., Morris Commc'ns Corp. v. PGA Tour, Inc., 364 F.3d 1288, 1295 (11th Cir.
2004); United Asset Coverage, Inc. v. Avaya, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1047 (N.D. I11.
2006).
62. See 1 ABA SECTION OF AN-nTRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 261-66
(6th ed. 2007).
63. See Walter, supra note 11, at 371 (showing that case examples offered to criticize
the doctrine were all won by the defendant except for Aspen Skiing).
64. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 738 F.2d 1509, 1519-22 (10th
Cir. 1984), affd on other grounds, 472 U.S. 585, 611 (1985).
65. Aspen Skiing, 738 F.2d at 1512.
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two had previously offered a popular multi-day joint ticket for all four
mountains, 66 but the defendant withdrew its participation without a credi-
ble business justification.67 Applying the MCI test, the Tenth Circuit up-
held a jury verdict against the defendant based on the essential facilities
doctrine. 68 It found that the plaintiff had established 1) control of an
essential facility by the defendant, a monopolist;69 2) the inability to du-
plicate the facility because of environmental restrictions on developing
new ski slopes in Aspen; 3) denial of access, which was undisputed; and 4)
feasibility of access, which was evidenced by the success of the previous
joint ticket.70 Though the Supreme Court affirmed, it did so on other
grounds, specifically declining to address the essential facilities doctrine. 71
Lower courts have since construed the doctrine very narrowly.
In 2004, the Supreme Court expressed its deep skepticism of the doc-
trine in Trinko.72 The critical tone of the Court's comments, though ar-
guably merely dicta,73 made abundantly clear that the current Supreme
Court does not look favorably on the doctrine.74 Trinko involved a class
action brought against a local telephone monopolist, Verizon, alleging an
antitrust violation based on Verizon's failure to adequately share its net-
work with rivals, as mandated by the Telecommunications Act of 1996. 75
The Federal Communications Commission had already found Verizon in
breach of its statutory obligations and had imposed a fine.76 The Court,
however, held that noncompliance with the Telecommunications Act did
not constitute a valid basis for antitrust liability77 and that the defendant
had no general duty to deal with rivals with whom it did not have a prior
course of dealing.78
As to the essential facilities doctrine, the Court made a point of dis-
claiming any involvement in its development saying that it was merely a
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1522.
68. Id. at 1519-22.
69. Id. at 1520-21. For unknown reasons, the defendant did not appeal the lower court
finding that downhill skiing in Aspen constituted the relevant market. See Aspen Skiing,
472 U.S. at 596 n.20, 600 n.26. Under this narrow definition, ski resorts outside of Aspen
were excluded from the geographic market, which allowed the defendant to be character-
ized as a monopolist because it controlled three of the four ski mountains in Aspen. If the
relevant market is in fact broader than the Aspen area, then the defendant would most
likely not have been considered a monopolist.
70. Aspen Skiing, 738 F.2d at 1521.
71. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 611 n.44 (1985).
72. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
410-11 (2004).
73. See id. at 410 (deciding the case on other grounds).
74. See Frischmann & Waller, supra note 11, at 9 (characterizing Trinko as represent-
ing "the near extinction of the doctrine in the Supreme Court"); HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 248 (2005) ("While not stating
it in so many words, Trinko may effectively have brought the era of antitrust essential
facilities claims to an end.").
75. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 402, 404.
76. Id. at 413.
77. Id. at 407.
78. Id. at 410.
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creation of the lower courts.79 In essence, it denied that Terminal Rail-
road, Associated Press, and Otter Tail were essential facilities cases, pre-
sumably because the opinions neither evoked the doctrine by name nor
expressed a clear standard of liability. The Court then declined to either
recognize or repudiate the doctrine 80 on the ground that, even assuming
its validity, it would be applicable only when there is no means of ac-
cess.81 That was not the case in Trinko, so said the Court, since the Tele-
communications Act mandated access. 82  The Court's dismissive
comments suggest that the status of the doctrine is precarious even when
intellectual property rights are not involved.
B. REVISITING THE CASES: IDENTIFYING COMMON PRINCIPLES
The Court's reaction in Trinko is consistent with the withering criticism
to which the doctrine has been subjected in recent years.83 It has been
said that no sound theoretical basis exists for the doctrine-"anything
one has that another wants may be called an 'essential facility." 84 The
late Phillip Areeda famously described essential facilities as "less a doc-
trine than an epithet, indicating some exception to the right to keep one's
creations to oneself, but not telling us what those exceptions are."'85 Her-
bert Hovenkamp said that the doctrine is "harmful" and "unnecessary"
and "should be abandoned" 86 or at least very narrowly circumscribed.87
This scathing assessment is overstated. While essential facilities cases
may indeed be undertheorized, even critics of the doctrine generally do
not disagree with their outcomes.88 It is true that plaintiffs have occasion-
ally made absurd essential facility claims, 89 but courts have usually
quickly rejected them. 90 On the rare occasions where lower courts have
79. Id. (referring to the doctrine as having been "crafted by some lower courts").
80. Id. at 411 ("We have never recognized such a doctrine ... and we find no need
either to recognize it or to repudiate it here.").
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See supra note 10.
84. Areeda, supra note 10, at 844.
85. Id. at 841.
86. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, 1 771c.
87. Id. A few scholars, however, disagree. Frischmann & Waller, supra note 11, at 4.
See generally Waller, supra note 11 (rebutting Areeda's famous critique of the essential
facilities doctrine). In a recent seminal article, Professors Brett Frischmann and Spencer
Waller persuasively argued for a revitalization of the doctrine based on an "infrastructural
theory." Frischmann & Waller, supra note 11, at 4. They would apply the theory, assuming
other antitrust requirements are met, in cases where a monopolist refuses access to "infra-
structure," which they define as including not only traditional infrastructure such as
"bridges, highways, ports, electric power grids, and telephone networks," but also "ideas,
the Internet, and other assets which are vital inputs to the production of wealth at later
stages of production on a basis disproportionate for their actual use." Id.
88. See, e.g., Areeda, supra note 10, at 842-43 (approving of the Court's decision in
Terminal Railroad and finding the Associated Press decision defensible); id. at 847-48 (en-
dorsing the outcome of Otter Tail).
89. See id. at 843-44 (describing several such cases).
90. See Waller, supra note 11, at 371 (responding to Areeda's critique by showing that,
in all the cases Areeda cited, only one case, Aspen Skiing, resulted in a plaintiff verdict).
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found liability based on the doctrine in questionable cases, those deci-
sions were almost always overturned or affirmed on other grounds. 91
Courts, then, seem to have generally gotten the cases right.
A close look at the cases suggests that a few common principles, in fact,
underlie the seemingly ad hoc rulings and explain their essence. A com-
mon feature in the key essential facilities cases is that they all involved
networks and/or natural monopolies that provide necessities or form part
of society's infrastructure. 92 As will be discussed in more detail, this sug-
gests that courts have tended to apply the doctrine only when denial of
access would likely be socially wasteful, would severely inhibit innovation
and competition and would likely have effects that extend beyond harm
to competition in the immediate affected market.
1. Natural Monopolies and Networks
Except for Aspen Skiing,93 the "essential facilities" in all the key cases
previously discussed had natural monopoly characteristics or were a criti-
cal part of a network, or both.94 By definition, a facility with natural mo-
nopoly properties means that it entails high fixed costs and low marginal
costs making duplication of the facility infeasible, inefficient or socially
wasteful. 95 However, where the natural monopoly facility is part of a net-
work system, the entire system may not be a natural monopoly, 96 which
means that competition may be possible and desirable in other parts of
the enterprise. For example, while railroad bridges or railroad tracks may
be natural monopolies, railroad service in some markets is not-we can
have more than one railroad providing train service through a state (for
example, New Jersey Transit trains and Amtrak in New Jersey; Metro
North trains and Amtrak in Connecticut). 97 At the same time, it would
be socially wasteful for them not to share the same railroad tracks.98 It is
in these circumstances that courts could most reasonably apply the essen-
tial facilities doctrine. 99 A review of the relevant case law confirms that is
precisely what courts have done, though they may not have explained
their decisions in that fashion.
91. See infra notes 139-142 and accompanying text.
92. See infra notes 93-152 and accompanying text.
93. See generally Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 738 F.2d 1509
(10th Cir. 1984), affd on other grounds, 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
94. See supra note 21 (definition of network).
95. See 2 ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
119-25 (1971) (discussing the economics of natural monopoly and the undesirability of
competition in natural monopoly markets).
96. See id. at 124 (explaining that "certain portions of an industry-those subject to
decreasing costs-may be natural monopolies while other portions may not").
97. Id. at 125.
98. Id. at 122.
99. Historically, firms with a "virtual monopoly" were required under English com-
mon law and U.S. courts to deal with everyone on reasonable and non-discriminatory
terms. See Bruce Wyman, The Law of Public Callings as a Solution of the Trust Problem,
17 HARV. L. REv. 156, 166 (1904).
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For example, the railroad bridge over the Mississippi River in Terminal
Railroad was a natural monopoly in that it enjoyed large economies of
scale-very high fixed costs and minimal marginal costs.100 Duplicating
it, even if feasible, would have been economically inefficient and socially
wasteful.10' Yet, every train that hoped to pass through St. Louis to and
from different parts of the country had to cross the Mississippi River.' 02
There was no evidence that the entire rail system was a natural monopoly
and that railway traffic was insufficient to support competition. 0 3 Denial
of access to the bridge, however, prevented that competition. 10 4 There-
fore, it was unsurprising that the Court in Terminal Railroad directed the
defendant to grant competing railroads equal and non-discriminatory ac-
cess to the railroad bridge and related facilities. 0 5
Otter Tail'06 and MCI,10 7 likewise, involved facilities with natural mo-
nopoly characteristics that were part of networks providing infrastruc-
tural elements of our economy. For Otter Tail, the network of
transmission lines carrying electricity from the generation source to
homes, businesses, and other establishments was a natural monopoly be-
cause building and maintaining these lines obviously entailed high fixed
costs, while the marginal cost of transmission, once the lines were in-
stalled, was low. 108 And duplicating transmission lines simply made no
economic sense.' 09 Electric power generation, however, was not a natural
monopoly, and could support competition. 10 To be viable, though, a
competing electric power company had to be able to distribute the power
it generated to the ultimate customers, and it can only be done via trans-
mission lines."' If duplicating the lines is economically infeasible or so-
cially wasteful, but competition in the provision of power is beneficial, it
follows that compulsory sharing of the lines with rivals on non-discrimi-
natory terms is economically efficient and socially desirable." 2 Again, in
this context, it was unsurprising that the Supreme Court ordered the reg-
ulated monopolist power company to allow its rival to transmit power
through the monopolist's transmission lines.' 13
100. United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383, 395-97 (1912). In
fact, bridges are usually considered the classic example of a natural monopoly.
101. Id. at 397.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 401-02.
104. Id.
105. See id. at 411-13.
106. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 369 (1973).
107. MCI Commc'ns Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 891 (1983).
108. Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 369-70.
109. Id.
110. See James E. Meeks, Concentration in the Electric Power Industry: The Impact of
Antitrust Policy, 72 COLUM. L. Rav. 64, 69-75 (1975) (discussing the economics of electric
power production and distribution).
111. Id. at 74.
112. Id. at 87.
113. Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 368, 382.
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The same analysis applies to MCI.114 The "local loop" or "last mile" of
telephone wires leading to the millions of homes and businesses with tele-
phone service is a natural monopoly. It is not cost-effective to duplicate
them because of the high fixed costs of installation and the low marginal
costs of transmitting the last additional call. 115 However, these local
loops are part of a larger telecommunications system, and competition
became possible in other parts of the network-specifically, in long-dis-
tance telephone service-in the early 1980s because of the development
of new technologies. In order for competition to emerge, however, po-
tential long-distance providers such as MCI had to be able to connect to
the switch linking to the local loop, which was controlled by the then-
monopolist, AT&T.116 The Seventh Circuit's decision to require AT&T
to provide interconnection to MCI, given these facts, seemed to be eco-
nomically efficient and good for consumers.
Although Associated Press"1 7 initially may not seem to fit the Terminal
Railroad,"8 Otter Tail,119 and MCP 20 mode, there are basic similarities.
The Associated Press was essentially a network of over a thousand news-
papers that pooled their efforts to produce and distribute news.12' Each
newspaper contributed its local stories to the Associated Press which then
culled, aggregated, and distributed them to all members, along with the
international news it gathered from other sources.12 2 The organization
showed significant network effects in that membership became more val-
uable as more newspapers joined the network. News would be forthcom-
ing from more sources in more communities, and Associated Press news
would reach additional communities, which could attract more
advertisers.
Though the Associated Press was not a traditional natural monopoly,
the presence of network effects meant that the market tended toward
winner-take-most, which made effective competition from a competing
news network less likely,123 at least in that era. This, in turn, meant that
membership in the Associated Press was essential to competition in news-
paper markets. 124 Where network effects are important, as in Associated
Press,125 access would provide social benefits in excess of private benefits
and, therefore, is socially desirable. Viewed from this perspective, the
114. See generally MCI, 708 F.2d 1081.
115. See Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 489-90 (2002) (noting, in an-
other telecommunications case, the difficulty of duplicating the local telephone network,
i.e., the "local loop" or "last mile" of wire to homes and other establishments, and the
"almost insurmountable competitive advantage" it gives to the incumbent monopolist).
116. See MCI, 708 F.2d at 1132-33.
117. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
118. United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
119. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
120. MCI, 708 F.2d 1081.
121. Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 3-4.
122. See id. at 4.
123. See supra notes 25-39 and accompanying text.
124. See Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 9.
125. See id. at 1.
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Supreme Court's decision in Associated Press126 fits in nicely with Termi-
nal Railroad,127 Otter Tail,128 and MCI.129
Of the well-known essential facilities cases, only the Tenth Circuit's de-
cision in Aspen Skiing,130 subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court
on other grounds, is truly controversial. It is instructive that it is also the
only important case that did not involve a network or have natural mo-
nopoly characteristics. With a natural monopoly or a network, there is a
theoretically sound rationale for requiring access. 13' Compelling a domi-
nant firm to share a facility with natural monopoly characteristics with
rivals gives us the benefit of competition, usually in a downstream or ad-
jacent market, without the attendant social waste and inefficiency in-
volved in the rival's duplicating the facility, assuming that duplication is
even feasible. Granting access in a network generally produces social
benefits that are disproportionately greater than the private benefits, be-
cause of positive network externalities.132
Aspen Skiing133 is controversial largely because the case lacked these
characteristics and, consequently, application of the doctrine seemed un-
moored to theory. With Aspen Skiing,134 compelling the defendant to
share its "facility" with its smaller competitor would undoubtedly benefit
Aspen skiers who prefer the convenience of, and the choice made possi-
ble by, a single multi-day joint ticket. But a coherent principle for invok-
ing the doctrine was noticeably missing. True, the defendant controlled
three of the four ski mountains in Aspen; regulatory restrictions prohib-
ited the development of a new ski mountain there; the plaintiff needed
access to the "facility" to be a viable competitor; and access was feasible
as evidenced by the previous, immensely successful multi-mountain,
multi-day ticket. 135 Thus, under the MCI test,136 the Tenth Circuit's reli-
ance on the doctrine was probably defensible. But one does not get a
sense of what fundamentally made the facility essential, or even what
constituted the essential facility-the ski mountains or the joint ticket?
Criticism of the doctrine as it was applied by the Tenth Circuit thus seems
justified. And, the Supreme Court was probably wise to sidestep the doc-
trine and affirm on other grounds. 137
As was the situation in Aspen Skiing,138 lower court cases that have
rejected the essential facilities doctrine usually had no natural monopoly
126. Id.
127. United States v. Terminal, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
128. R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
129. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983).
130. MCI Commc'ns Corp. v. AT & T, Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing
Co., 738 F.2d 1509 (10th Cir. 1984).
131. See supra notes 95-116 and accompanying text.
132. See infra Part II.B.2.
133. Aspen Skiing, 738 F.2d 1509.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1520-21.
136. MCI Commc'ns Corp. v. AT & T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1983).
137. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp, 472 U.S. 585, 611 n.44 (1985).
138. Aspen Skiing, 738 F.2d 1509.
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characteristics. Nor were they part of any network. For example, Flip
Side Products, Inc. v. Jam Products, Ltd. involved a promotion company
that argued a large auditorium (controlled by the defendant) in which it
wished to book concerts was an essential facility. 139 Olympia Equipment
Leasing Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co. involved a teletype machine
marketer who invoked the doctrine when a dominant competitor ceased
to show potential customers a vendor list, the alleged essential facility,
listing other major teletype machine marketers (which included the plain-
tiff) from whom customers may make their purchases. 140 In Twin Labo-
ratories, Inc. v. Weider Health & Fitness, the essential facilities claim was
based on the refusal of the dominant bodybuilding food supplement pro-
ducer to advertise a competitor's products in its body building magazine
(the alleged essential facility). 141 In Florida Fuels, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co.,
the essential facility claim involved the dominant oil seller's refusal to
share usage of its storage tanks with its rival, which had no such tanks of
its own.142
In all of these cases the essential facilities claims, bordering on the ab-
surd, were dismissed on grounds that at least one of the elements of the
MCI143 test was not satisfied. It is perhaps the undefined, seemingly ad
hoc, nature of these inquiries that has drawn criticism. However, these
decisions could easily be analyzed more theoretically to reach the same
results if we simply reframe the question to ask whether the facility had
the economic characteristics of a natural monopoly or a network, such
that open access would be efficient and socially beneficial. In each case,
the answer would be "no," and the legal resolution, though unchanged,
would be more rooted in principle.
2. Providing Necessities and Other Infrastructure
Again, except for Aspen Skiing,144 the key U.S. essential facilities cases
share another common feature-the end product or service provided
were necessities, or part of society's infrastructure. Therefore, denial of
access would have adversely affected the public interest and not merely
the competitive process in the immediate market. That transportation
systems (Terminal Railroad),145 public utilities (Otter Tail), 14 6 and tele-
communications (MCI) 14 7 provide necessities is self-evident. Because we
139. 843 F.2d 1024, 1028-34 (7th Cir. 1988) (affirming summary judgment in favor of the
defendant on the essential facility claim).
140. 797 F.2d 370, 373-80, 383 (7th Cir. 1986) (reversing a judgment for the plaintiff,
stating that the defendant had no duty to affirmatively assist a competitor).
141. 900 F.2d 566, 568-70 (2d Cir. 1990) (rejecting the essential facilities claim and af-
firming summary judgment for the defendant).
142. 717 F. Supp. 1528, 1530-37 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (rejecting the defendant's essential
facilities claim).
143. MCI Commc'ns Corp. v. AT & T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1983).
144. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509 (10th Cir. 1984),
affd on other grounds, 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
145. United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
146. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
147. MCI, 708 F.2d 1081.
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are a democracy and the functioning of a democratic government re-
quires the free flow of information and public opinion, the generation
and dissemination of news can also be viewed as a necessity. 148 Justice
Frankfurter recognized this point in his concurrence in Associated Press
when he described the news network as a business imbued with the public
interest and likened it to a public utility. 149
In Aspen Skiing,1 50 this necessity or public interest factor did not exist.
While the dominant ski company's refusal to continue offering a joint
ticket with its rival may have adversely affected the competitor and
Aspen skiers, skiing facilities are not public utilities or necessities. Nor is
skiing an activity infused with the public interest. While compelling the
dominant ski company to share its "facility" with its competitor may en-
hance the enjoyment of Aspen skiers who like the freedom to move
around all four mountains on a single ticket, 151 there is no significant so-
cietal impact beyond that.152
Requiring a public interest attribute by showing that the good or ser-
vice is a necessity or an infrastructure would provide a sound limiting
principle to the doctrine. Though they have not explained their essential
facilities decisions this way, courts have in fact consistently invoked the
doctrine to compel access only when it impacted the public interest, con-
tradicting the critique that the doctrine lacks principled limits.
C. APPLICABILITY OF THE DOCTRINE TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES
Although none of the discussed cases involved intellectual property,
and U.S. courts have never actually applied essential facilities to con-
demn refusals to license intellectual property, several cases have recog-
nized, in principle, the appropriateness of such application given the right
set of facts. 153 For example, in Data General,154 a district court acknowl-
edged that the doctrine could apply to a computer systems manufac-
148. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 29 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring) (discussing the importance of the access to news and "the relation of such access
to the function of a free press in our democratic society").
149. Id. at 28-29 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
150. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509 (10th Cir. 1984),
affd on other grounds, 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
151. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605-07
(1985) (observing the popularity of the multi-day, multi-mountain joint ticket before it was
terminated).
152. Various other cases in which lower courts have rejected essential facilities claims
similarly lack public interest implications. See supra notes 139-142 and accompanying text.
153. See, e.g., Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publ'ns, Inc., 737 F. Supp. 610, 617-20 (D.
Kan. 1990) (discussing the essential facilities doctrine where the alleged essential facility is
copyrighted telephone listings), rev'd on other grounds, 957 F.2d 765 (10th Cir. 1992); Bell-
south Adver. & Publ'g Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publ'g, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 1551, 1566 (S.D.
Fla. 1988) (discussing the possible application of essential facilities doctrine to copyrighted
directory databases), rev'd on other grounds, 999 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1993); see also infra
notes 154-179 and accompanying text.
154. Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 761 F. Supp. 185 (D. Mass.
1991), affd in part and remanded, 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994).
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turer's refusal to license its copyrighted diagnostic software to rival repair
service providers, though it found the specific facts insufficient to support
the doctrine. 155 The repair service providers had claimed that use of the
software was needed for their effective competition with the manufac-
turer in the service market. 156
In Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp.,157 a district court applied the essen-
tial facilities doctrine to intellectual property rights. Intel had ceased to
supply certain computer manufacturers with its patented sample chips
and related proprietary information 58-information that they needed to
continue building Intel-based computers. 159 Intel's motivation was to
force concessions from these manufacturers in connection with their un-
related patent disputes with Intel.160 After concluding that Intel was a
monopolist in the computer microprocessor market,161 the district court
treated Intel's refusal-to-deal as the denial of an essential facility because
the chips and technical information were not available elsewhere,1 62
could not be feasibly duplicated, and access to them was essential for ef-
fective competition.1 63 Although the Federal Circuit later reversed, it
was on the ground that Intel and the plaintiff were not competitors (but
merely had a supplier/customer relationship),1 64 and not because it found
the essential facilities doctrine inapplicable to intellectual property rights.
In two other general refusal-to-deal claims involving intellectual prop-
erty, Kodak165 and Xerox,166 the Circuit Courts reached opposite results.
Though these decisions were not based on, and did not address, the es-
sential facilities doctrine, their holdings and rationales should apply
equally well to the issue of the doctrine's applicability to refusals to li-
cense intellectual property rights.
In Kodak, on remand from the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed a jury verdict against Kodak on a claim that it had violated anti-
trust laws by refusing to sell its replacement parts, some of which were
patented, to its competitors in the repair service market. 167 In its earlier
opinion remanding the case, the Supreme Court had remarked in dicta in
a footnote that "power gained through.., patent [and] copyright.. . can
give rise to liability if 'a seller exploits his dominant position in one mar-
155. Id. at 191-92.
156. Id. at 192.
157. 3 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (N.D. Ala. 1998), vacated, 195 F.3d 1346, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
158. Id. at 1267.
159. Id. at 1261-63.
160. Id. at 1267.
161. Id. at 1275.
162. Id. at 1278.
163. Id.
164. Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1357-59 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also id.
at 1358 ("The district court erred in holding that Intel's superior microprocessor product
and Intergraph's dependency thereon converted Intel's special customer benefits into an
,essential facility' under the Sherman Act.").
165. Image Technical Servs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997).
166. In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
167. Kodak, 125 F.3d at 1200, 1228.
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ket to expand his empire into the next."168 Citing this footnote, the
Ninth Circuit rejected Kodak's assertion that, as a patent holder, it had
the right to not sell its patented parts to the plaintiffs and, therefore, its
refusal to do so could not give rise to antitrust liability.169 Recognizing
that patent and copyright laws do grant exclusivity rights to intellectual
property owners, the Ninth Court reconciled the tension between those
rights and the antitrust duty to deal by concluding that the desire to pro-
tect one's intellectual property rights gives rise to a rebuttable presump-
tion of valid business justification. 170
In Xerox, however, the Federal Circuit reached a different result in a
remarkably similar case.171 Xerox manufactured copiers and replace-
ments parts and also provided repair service for those copiers. 172 It re-
fused to sell its patented replacement parts or to license its copyrighted
diagnostic software to its rivals in the copier repair service market.1 73
Declining to follow the Ninth Circuit in Kodak, the Federal Circuit
stressed the importance of exclusivity under patent law and effectively
held that a patent holder has an absolute right to exclude others from the
invention except in the limited case of "illegal tying, fraud in the Patent
and Trademark Office, or sham litigation."' 74
Finally and interestingly, in United States v. Microsoft Corp.,175 proba-
bly the most important U.S. monopolization case tried in the last few
decades, an important remedial provision in the ultimate settlement of
the case (after remand from the court of appeals) required Microsoft to
license certain interoperability information to producers of non-Microsoft
servers. 176 This provision was designed to ensure the compatibility of
non-Microsoft work-group server operating systems with Windows, the
dominant PC operating system found on most PCs linked to office work-
group servers. Without interoperability, these non-Microsoft servers
would be unable to compete effectively with Microsoft's own servers,
which are obviously fully compatible with Windows.
The inclusion of this compulsory licensing provision in the settlement
was surprising since the issue of refusals to license interoperability infor-
mation or other intellectual property rights was neither litigated at trial
nor addressed in the lower court opinions in the United States.1 77 With-
168. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 479 n.29 (1992)
(quoting Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611 (1953)).
169. Kodak, 125 F.3d at 1215-16.
170. Id. at 1218.
171. In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d at 1322.
172. Id. at 1324.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1327.
175. 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001).
176. United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (CKK), at III.E (D.D.C. Nov. 12,
2002), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f200400/200457.pdf.
177. There was only one minor reference to an instance of refusal to share protected
information. Microsoft allegedly delayed, for four months, the release to Netscape of the
technical specifications for a program interface that Netscape needed to make its browser
interoperable with Windows. This delay effectively prevented Netscape from competing
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out access to all the facts, it is of course impossible to know why no such
claim was asserted at trial, if U.S. antitrust authorities were concerned
enough to insist on the compulsory licensing provision. 178 Whatever the
reason, their negotiation for that remedial order must reflect a belief that
lack of access to interoperability information in computer network indus-
tries is a serious issue with potential anticompetitive consequences that
must be addressed.'7 9
IV. APPLYING LESSONS DRAWN FROM TRADITIONAL
ESSENTIAL FACILITIES CASES TO MODERN
ACCESS CONCERNS
As discussed in Part II, interoperability and access are central issues in
modern-day network industries, which form the core of today's economy.
The essential facilities doctrine seems well-suited, in proper cases, to ad-
dress anticompetitive problems that may arise when a monopolist's denial
of access to information impedes interoperability, thereby hindering com-
petition in adjacent markets. Yet U.S. courts have rarely, if ever, applied
the doctrine in this context.180 Critics contend that the doctrine reduces
incentives for innovation and conflicts with intellectual property law and
policy' 81-arguments that will be addressed in Part V.
Misgivings about the doctrine are also grounded on exaggerated con-
cerns that it is ill-defined and lacks theoretical consistency. But, as earlier
discussed, the traditional U.S. essential facilities cases are in fact rooted
in sound, though often unexpressed, principles. 182 Where the economic
and social case for compulsory sharing is strong-such as when the facil-
ity has natural monopoly characteristics or has network effects, and the
end-product involves a necessity or infrastructure-courts have applied
the doctrine.' 83 When those features are absent and, therefore, the case
for the holiday season that year. United States v. Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 33 (D.D.C.
1999). This reference was not included in the court of appeal's decision. See Microsoft,
253 F.3d 34.
178. One possible reason may be that success on such a claim would require reliance on
the monopoly leveraging theory, which has fallen out of favor in the United States as a
result of criticism from the Chicago School. See Steven C. Salop, Vertical Mergers and
Monopoly Leverage, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW
669, 669 (Peter Newman ed., 1999).
179. This interoperability issue was front and center in the European case brought
against Microsoft, which will be discussed in more detail below. See infra Part IV.A.
180. See supra Part III.C.
181. See, e.g., Areeda, supra note 10, at 844-45 (referring to the importance of not chil-
ling "desirable activities"); AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, 1 771b; Paul D. Mar-
quardt & Mark Leddy, The Essential Facilities Doctrine and Intellectual Property Rights: A
Response to Pitofsky, Patterson, and Hooks, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 847, 856 (2003) ("Allowing
those rivals to have access to the innovator's intellectual property simply by declaring
themselves beaten runs a serious risk of short-circuiting that dynamic [of innovation by one
company spurring innovation by rivals]."); id. ("The promise of protection for intellectual
property encourages companies to innovate in order to gain whatever economic benefits
can be gained from the exclusive right to exploit the innovation."); see also infra Part V.B.
182. See infra Part V.B.
183. See supra Part II.B.
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for access is weak, courts have tended to reject it. 184
We can rely on these same principles to sort through cases involving
the failure to disclose interoperability information in order to identify
which ones warrant invoking the doctrine and which ones do not. This
method is preferable to treating refusals to supply interoperability infor-
mation as a separate class of conduct to which special rules should pre-
sumably apply, as the European Commission seems to propose. 185 That
is because markets that lack interoperability do not all bear similar eco-
nomic or consumer effects. I will use, below, two familiar narratives in-
volving interoperability and access issues-the European Commission
case against Microsoft and the controversy surrounding Apple's iPod/
iTunes formerly closed-system-to show how principles distilled from the
historical essential facilities cases should apply to reach different results.
A. THE EU CASE AGAINST MICROSOFT1 8 6
1. Interoperability Issue
Unlike the U.S. case, the European case against Microsoft was, at its
heart, about interoperability and access. 187 Microsoft, whose product,
Windows, dominates the PC (or client) operating systems market, com-
peted with Sun Microsystems and other rivals in the server operating sys-
tems market. 188 A server is basically a powerful computer that provides
applications and other functions to multiple PCs linked together in a net-
work.189 Microsoft was charged with refusing to license certain inter-
operability information, known as "communications protocols," to its
competitors in the server operating systems market that would facilitate
the full interoperability of their servers with Windows. 190 Unless there is
interoperability, businesses needing servers for their networks of desktop
computers (mostly running on Windows because Windows is the domi-
184. See id.
185. See EC Discussion Paper, supra note 17, § 9.2.3. In this Discussion Paper, in a
separate subsection entitled "Refusal to Supply Information Needed For Interoperability,"
the Commission states that a "special case arises" when a dominant firm refuses to supply
interoperability information "that allows it to extend its dominance from one market to
another," and that "leveraging market power from one market to another by refusing in-
teroperability information may be an abuse of dominant a position" under Article 82. Id.
186. Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R. 11-360, 2007 WL 2693858.
187. The Microsoft decision addressed two substantive claims: bundling and refusal to
supply interoperability information. The first claim related to Microsoft's technological
tying of its Windows Media Player product to Windows, the dominant PC operating sys-
tem. On this claim, the Court of First Instance ("CFI") also found against Microsoft. See
Microsoft, 2007 E.C.R. 11-3601, at 1 43. This Article, however, will discuss only the more
interesting of the two issues-the claim that Microsoft's refusal to license interoperability
information to its competitors in the work group server operating systems market consti-
tuted an abuse of dominance.
188. CFI Microsoft Judgment, supra note 1, $J 30-35.
189. Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
server (last visited Feb. 28, 2009). (A server is "a computer in a network that is used to
provide services (as access to files or shared peripherals or the routing of e-mail) to other
computers in the network.").
190. CFI Microsoft Judgment, supra not 1, 1$ 36-37.
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nant PC operating system) would most likely choose Microsoft servers
over non-Microsoft servers, even if they actually prefer the latter.191 This
would allow Microsoft to leverage its dominant position in the PC operat-
ing systems market (through Windows) into the work-group server
market. 192
2. Court of First Instance (CFI) Holding on the Issue
a. Background: European case precedents pre-Microsoft
Though the term is not used, the European community recognizes the
essential facilities principle under the rubric of abuse of dominant posi-
tion, which constitutes a violation of Article 82 of the EC Treaty.193 In
Commercial Solvents,194 the first EU case to apply the doctrine, the Euro-
pean Court of Justice ("ECJ") held that a dominant supplier of an input
abused its dominant position when it refused to supply the input to a
customer, the supplier's competitor in the downstream derivative market,
"with the object of reserving such raw materials for manufacturing its
own derivatives, and therefore risks eliminating all competition" from
that competitor. 195 The courts subsequently articulated an indispensabil-
ity requirement for the doctrine. 196
The standard of liability evolved further in cases in which the alleged
essential facility consisted of intellectual property rights. In Volvo v.
Veng,197 the ECJ held that a dominant firm's refusal to grant a license to
its "protected design" for car body panels, standing alone, could not con-
stitute abuse of dominant position, since the right to exclude "constitutes
the very subject-matter of [the IP holder's] exclusive right" under IP
law.1 98 However, such a refusal could be considered abusive in three lim-
ited situations, including an "arbitrary refusal to supply spare parts to
independent repairers." 199
191. Id. 619.
192. Id. 1291, 1350.
193. Article 82 states: "Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position
within the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible
with the common market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States." Treaty
Establishing the European Community, art. 82, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 3 [herein-
after EC Treaty].
194. Joined Cases 6/73 & 7/73, Commercial Solvents v. Commission, 1974 E.C.R. 223.
195. Id. 25.
196. See Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. v. Mediaprint, 1998 E.C.R. 1-7791;
Case T-504/93, Ladbroke v. Commission, 1997 E.C.R. 11-923. In Oscar Bronner, the ECJ
refused to require a dominant Austrian newspaper, which had a home distribution net-
work, to include a small competitor's newspaper in its home delivery service, on the
ground that the dominant firm's distribution system was not indispensable. Bronner, 1998
E.C.R. 1-7791, IT 41-47. In Ladbroke, the CFI upheld an EC finding that a broadcaster of
French horse races did not abuse its dominant position in the relevant market when it
refused to license those broadcasts to a Belgian betting parlor. The CFI reasoned that
broadcasts of the races were not indispensable to the complainant's wagering business,
though they would have provided an additional service to the bettors. Ladbroke, 1997
ECR 11-923, 131.





The notion that a higher standard must be met before a dominant firm
can be compelled to license its intellectual property rights was more
clearly expressed in Magill2°° and IMS Health.20 1 In these two cases, the
courts held that "exceptional circumstances" must exist for any refusal to
license intellectual property rights to be condemned. 20 2 The exceptional
circumstances requirement was translated into a three-part test: 1) the
refusal prevented the emergence of a "new product," which the dominant
firm did not offer and for which there was potential consumer demand; 2)
the refusal allowed the dominant firm to reserve for itself "the secondary
market ... by excluding all competition on that market;" and 3) the re-
fusal was unjustified. 20 3 IMS Health further clarified that the conditions
must be cumulative for "exceptional circumstances" to be found.
204
b. Microsoft
In Microsoft,20 5 the CFI upheld the European Commission's findings
against the company. On the claim of denial of access to interoperability
information, the court acknowledged that, in the absence of "exceptional
circumstances," a dominant firm's refusal to license an intellectual prop-
erty right cannot constitute abusive conduct within the meaning of Arti-
cle 82.206 However, it then interpreted "exceptional circumstances" so
loosely that critics contend it rendered the limitation meaningless. 207 For
example, with respect to the condition that the refusal to license must
relate to an input indispensable for the development of a new product in
a secondary market, the CFI said that information is "indispensable" for
200. Case C-241/91, Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) v. Commission, 1995 E.C.R. 1-743, 4
C.M.L.R. 718 (1995) [hereinafter, Magill].
201. Case C-418101, IMS Health GmbH & Co. v. NDC Health GmbH & Co., 2004
E.C.R. 1-5039.
202. In Magill, three dominant broadcasters in the UK refused to license their copy-
righted program listings to a firm wishing to publish the first ever comprehensive weekly
TV program guide. In upholding the CFI and EC determination that the defendants' re-
fusal to license their protected program listings constituted an abuse of dominance, the
ECJ said that a dominant firm's exercise of its exclusivity right under IP law may constitute
abuse of dominance in "exceptional circumstances." Magill, 1995 E.C.R. 1-743, 2. In
IMS Health, the dominant firm had devised a "brick structure" for compiling pharmaceuti-
cal sales data in a way that complied with German privacy law and was also useful to
pharmaceutical companies for marketing; it sold the compiled data to the pharmaceutical
companies. Two new firms attempted to compete with IMS but found that the pharmaceu-
tical companies would only accept data organized according to IMS's "brick structure"
format, which was copyrighted. When the case reached the ECJ through a convoluted
procedural process, the Court reiterated the "exceptional circumstances" limitation on a
dominant firm's right to refuse to license intellectual property rights. And, it affirmed and
clarified the three conditions that must be satisfied for "exceptional circumstances" to be
found. IMS Health, 2004 E.C.R. 1-5039, 52.
203. Magill, 1995 E.C.R. 1-743, $$ 50-56.
204. IMS Health, 2004 E.C.R. 1-05039, 1 52.
205. See CFI Microsoft Judgment, supra note 1.
206. Id. 1 327.
207. See, e.g., Renata B. Hesse, Counseling Clients on Refusal to Supply Issues in the
Wake of the EC Microsoft Case, 22 ANrrrRusT 32, 34 (2008) ("Where the interoperability
information is of any competitive significance, it is difficult to imagine a set of circum-
stances where this standard of 'indispensability' would not be satisfied.").
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interoperability if it is necessary for rivals to achieve the same level of
interoperability that can be achieved by the dominant firm's own prod-
uct.20 8 And, to satisfy the condition of foreclosure of a "new product" in
a secondary market, the court held that it was sufficient to show the re-
fusal to license impeded the "technical development" (presumably some
form of improvement) of an existing product.20 9
Perhaps not without justification, commentators have criticized the CFI
Microsoft opinion for its shaky analysis of the exceptional circumstances
standard and of EU case precedents,210 but it is outside the scope of this
Article to enter this debate. The limited purpose of the EU Microsoft
discussion here is merely to argue that even if the CFI analysis was some-
what forced, based on tests established in European case law, the case has
all the important attributes found in the key U.S. essential facilities cases
such as Terminal Railroad, Otter Tail, Associated Press, and MCI, as dis-
cussed below. As such, the decision is economically reasonable.
3. Microsoft: Network Effects, Natural Monopoly, and Provision of a
Necessity
Like the facilities in the key U.S. cases, Microsoft's Windows, the domi-
nant PC operating system, exhibits network effects and natural monopoly
characteristics. Strong network effects arise from the fact that the more
popular Windows becomes, the more valuable it is to users because more
software applications would be written for it, which further increases
Windows' popularity, leading to even more supporting applications being
developed. 211 Windows also has strong natural monopoly characteristics
in that it enjoys significant economies of scale on the supply side: fixed
costs for research and development are high, while marginal costs of dis-
tribution are minimal. Though Windows is an intellectual property and
not a physical facility, there is no reason why information and other in-
tangibles cannot be considered an essential facility if they have all the
economic properties associated with physical "essential facilities."
To the extent that Windows has significant network effects and is a
modem-day natural monopoly, the CFI's decision on interoperability
should not be considered an outlier as it is entirely consistent with the
principles that underlie and explain the historical, relatively non-contro-
versial, U.S. essential facilities cases. Because Windows is the de facto
standard for operating systems for client PCs, those building servers must
ensure the servers' ability to communicate effectively with Windows. To
do that, they must have the program's communications protocols, or its
208. CFI Microsoft Judgment, supra note 1, $T 141, 369.
209. Id. 647.
210. See, e.g., Hesse, supra note 207, at 33-35 (suggesting that the CFI interpretation of
the "new product" requirement is inconsistent with case precedents which "had been un-
derstood to require a showing of foreclosure of an entirely new product").
211. The strong network effects of Windows were discussed in detail in the U.S. case




interface information. 212 Without that information, as the European
Commission and the CFI correctly noted, non-Microsoft servers cannot
be fully interoperable with Windows, the operating system found on cli-
ent PCs in most establishments. 2t 3 This, in turn, means that non-
Microsoft servers cannot provide the level of network functionality pro-
vided by Microsoft's own work-group servers,214 which obviously have no
interoperability issues. And those seeking servers for their computer net-
works would be driven to Microsoft's product, though they might have
preferred an alternative server had it been fully compatible with
Windows.
Because of substantial network effects, full interoperability (or an open
standard) is particularly beneficial to consumers. Every user would enjoy
the large, collective, network externalities that are created as more users
are added on.215 Limiting access would reduce these positive externali-
ties that would otherwise accrue to consumers. The combination of
strong network effects and natural monopoly characteristics also makes
an inter-system challenge extremely difficult, thus making access to inter-
operability information all the more critical for competition and con-
sumer choice. Absent access, Microsoft would be able to leverage its
existing dominance in the PC operating systems market (through Win-
dows) into the work-group server operating systems and other comple-
mentary markets and prevent competition in those markets to the
detriment of consumers.21 6
Additionally, in all the key historical U.S. cases that have applied the
essential facilities doctrine to find liability, the product or service for
which competition was introduced (through compulsory access) was a ne-
cessity or an infrastructure: for example, electricity in Otter Tail; transpor-
tation in Terminal Railroad; telecommunications in MCI; and news in
Associated Press.217 While necessity of the end product is not an element
of the essential facilities doctrine under the MCI test,218 it is a good coun-
terweight against arguments that compulsory licensing of intellectual
property would wrongly deprive intellectual property holders of their le-
gitimate rewards.219 Few people would dispute the notion that personal
computers and the Internet are modern day necessities and are an inte-
gral part of the social fabric of society. The refusal to license interoper-
ability information in the European Microsoft case, just as the blocking of
212. CFI Microsoft Judgment, supra note 1, 220.
213. Id. 1$ 188-89.
214. Id. 558.
215. See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
216. See CFI Microsoft Judgment, supra note 1, 91 306.
217. See supra Part III-B-2.
218. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
219. See, e.g., AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, 1 773e ("The first caveat is that
no essential facilities rule should be used to deprive an otherwise lawful monopolist of its
'legitimate' reward."); Harry First, Microsoft and the Evolution of the Intellectual Property
Concept, 2006 Wis. L. REV. 1369, 1410 (describing Microsoft's intellectual property argu-




access in connection with transportation, public utilities, telecommunica-
tions, and the news, impacts public interest, which makes the application
of essential facilities to grant access entirely appropriate.
B. THE IPOD/ITUNES INTEROPERABILITY DEBATE
Not all refusals to provide interoperability information, however, are
equally important from an antitrust perspective, and common themes
drawn from the traditional essential facilities cases may provide a princi-
pled basis for distinguishing between different interoperability scenarios.
As discussed above, these themes explain why application of the doctrine
was appropriate in the European Microsoft case. However, in the iPod/
iTunes context, had Apple not voluntarily changed to an effectively open
system in January 2009,220 application of the doctrine to compel access
would have been difficult to rationalize, assuming that the MCI test can
be satisfied.
As is commonly known, Apple's iPod is the dominant portable digital
music player sold in the United States,221 with over seventy-five percent
of the relevant market share.222 The iTunes music store ("iTMS"), which
licenses music, videos, podcasts, audio books, and movies for download-
ing to a user's computer and transferring onto their iPods, is so successful
that it not only dominates the online digital music business, but recently
surpassed Wal-Mart to become the top music retailer in the United
States.223 Until recently, all the major music labels required iTMS to sell
their music files with digital rights management ("DRM"), which en-
220. See Press Release, Apple, Inc., Changes Coming to the iTunes Store (Jan. 6, 2009),
http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2009/01/06itunes.html (announcing that, beginning imme-
diately, the iTunes store will sell music in DRM-free format, after reaching agreement with
all four major music labels); Brad Stone, Copy an iTunes Song? Go Ahead, Apple Says,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2009, at B1 (reporting that Apple will begin to sell music without
DRM, which means that consumers will be able to play downloaded songs on other digital
devices).
221. From 2003 to the end of the third quarter of 2008, Apple sold over ninety-three
million iPods. See Apple Investor Relations, http://www.apple.com/investor (last visited
Feb. 20, 2009) (select "Earning Releases" tab; select Apple Quarterly Reports; select
"Data Summary"; then select each quarterly report from first Quarter 2003 through third
Quarter 2008; then add the quarterly iPod unit sales from each of the report).
222. David Becker, It's All About the iPod, CNET NEWS.COM, Apr. 18, 2005, http://
news.com.com/Its-all-about-the-iPod/2100-1041_3-5406519.html (estimating market share
of hard drive music players at ninety-two percent); Amanda Cantrell, Apple's Remarkable
Comeback Story, CNNMONEY.COM, Mar. 29, 2006, http://money.cnn.com/2006/03/29/tech-
nology/apple-anniversary/?%20cnn'yes (estimating iPod market share at seventy-three
percent); Ina Fried, Apple Earnings Continue to Hum Along, CNET NEWS.coM, Apr. 14,
2005, http://www.news.com/2102-1045_3-5669710.html?tag=ST.util.print (stating that Feb-
ruary 2006 figures give the company a greater than seventy percent market share of all
types of MP3 players, including more than ninety percent of the hard-drive market and
forty-three percent of the flash market).
223. See Press Release, Apple, Inc., iTunes Store Top Music Retailer in the US (April 3,
2008), http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2008/04/03iTunes.html. Apple reports that it sur-
passed Wal-Mart as the top music retailer in April 2008, has over fifty million customers,




crypts digital content and is designed to prevent unauthorized use.224
Apple developed and adopted a proprietary DRM technology, known
as FairPlay, so that music and other content purchased and downloaded
from iTMS worked only on iPods but not on other portable digital music
players.225 Users of non-iPod players, therefore, could not purchase mu-
sic from iTMS for use on their devices, and iPod users could not purchase
music from online music stores other than iTMS.
This restriction led to class actions filed against Apple in the United
States,226 and to legal227 and legislative efforts in France and other Euro-
pean countries aimed at compelling Apple to license FairPlay to its com-
petitors.228 The gist of their argument, and that of some commentators,
was that Apple's refusal to license FairPlay, and its refusal to use any
encryption technology other than FairPlay, unfairly limited interoper-
ability between its dominant products (iPod and iTunes) and that of its
competitors', and was anticompetitive. 229 They also maintained that dis-
closure of its FairPlay technology would enable competitors to produce
products that are compatible with Apple's, thus allowing consumers to
mix and match portable digital music devices and content providers.2 30
In January 2009, Apple announced that it had reached agreement with
the four major music labels and other independent labels permitting
iTMS to sell their music without DRM restriction.231 This effectively
makes iTunes music playable on competing devices, and should moot the
debate on whether Apple should be compelled to license FairPlay or per-
224. See Stone, supra note 220, at BI (reporting that Apple had sought to remove DRM
from music it sold but was unable to reach agreement with the major music labels until
very recently).
225. While iTunes was required to use DRM technology to encrypt digital music that it
sold to limit access to the content to authorized users, it did not have to each create its own
incompatible DRM format but could have collaborated in developing a common standard.
Or Apple could have opened up its DRM, known as FairPlay, to others through licensing.
226. See Sommers v. Apple, Inc., No. 5:07-cv-06507 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2007); Slattery
v. Apple, Inc., No. C 05-00037 JW, 2005 WL 2204981, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2005);
MEALEY'S LITiG. REP. CLASS AcTIONs 8 (2008); see also Antitrust Class Action Accuses
Apple of Monopolizing Music Market, 7-21.
227. See Giuseppe Mazziotti, Did Apple's Refusal to License Proprietary Information
Enabling Interoperability with Its iPod Music Player Constitute an Abuse under Article 82 of
the EC Treaty?, 28 WORLD COMPETnTION 253, 264 (2005). VirginMega, an online music
store in France, filed a legal challenge against Apple with the French Competition Council
alleging that Apple had abused its dominant position by refusing to license its FairPlay
technology, and asking the Competition Council to compel Apple to license it. Id. at 255.
The French Council held that the refusal to license did not give rise to liability under com-
petition law in that case because FairPlay was not essential for competition, as evidenced
by the existence of competitors in the market. Id. at 270.
228. Kevin J. Harrang, Challenges in the Global IT Market: Technology, Creative Con-
tent, and Intellectual Property Rights, 49 ARIz. L. REv. 29, 37-39 (2007) (discussing a
French bill and actions in other European countries aimed at forcing Apple to disclose
interoperability information to competitors); see also French Law Seeks Interoperability,
WIRED (Mar. 17, 2006), available at http://www.wired.com/print/politics/law/news/2006/03/
70436.
229. See, e.g., Nicola F. Sharpe & Olufunmilaya B. Arewa, Is Apple Playing Fair? Navi-
gating the iPod FairPlay DRM Controversy, 5 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 332 (2007).
230. See id.
231. See supra note 220
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haps adopt a non-proprietary DRM format. Nonetheless, the issue re-
mains alive as there are still pending class action antitrust suits against
Apple based on its past conduct. The issue is also interesting from a theo-
retical perspective.
If interoperability were determinative, then analogies to the European
case against Microsoft would seem apt. That is, assuming that Apple is a
true monopolist in the portable digital music player market, and non-
iTMS content providers have no feasible means of transferring music
from their online sites to iPods absent access to FairPlay (the interoper-
ability information), the essential facilities doctrine should apply to re-
quire Apple to license FairPlay to these non-iTunes providers, whose
music can then be downloaded to iPods, giving iPod users a choice of
content providers. Similarly, assuming that iTMS is a monopolist in the
online digital music market, and iPod's competitors must have the techni-
cal information regarding FairPlay to conform their devices to work with
iTunes, application of the essential facilities doctrine would seem
appropriate.
Many people, however, will intuitively sense a qualitative difference in
the situations presented by Microsoft and Apple, even though both in-
volved refusals to share interoperability information. 232 Apple's failure
to license FairPlay, somehow, does not seem as potentially harmful to
consumer welfare as Microsoft's conduct. The system may be "closed" in
the sense that, to play iTunes music or video on a portable digital music
player, consumers must purchase an iPod. But owners of other digital
music players have other non-iTMS online music stores to turn to, such as
the online retail giant Amazon. 233 And, users of iPods have other impor-
tant sources of music. Studies show, for example, that most music found
on iPods today comes, not from iTMS, but from non-encrypted sources-
mostly compact discs.234 And, music "ripped" from CDs onto consum-
ers' computers can be easily transferred onto any portable digital music
player, not only the iPod.
Furthermore, it is questionable how durable Apple's monopoly in the
iPod/iTunes system really is. While the iPod and iTMS are clearly domi-
nant in their respective markets today, their monopolies seem more frag-
ile than Microsoft's monopoly in PC operating systems. To some extent,
Apple's music monopoly has been aided by, and depended on, the music
labels' previous insistence on DRM protection. Once content providers
are willing to sell their music or videos without DRM, as they now are,
there is really no longer any substantial impediment (other than quality)
232. See, e.g., J. Thomas Rosch, Keynote Address: A Different Perspective on DRM, 22
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 971, 976-77 (2007) (expressing doubt that "antitrust should be
brought to bear.., to force [Apple] to make their products [iPod/iTunes] interoperable
with their competitors").
233. See Don Reisinger, DRM-Free iTunes Store to Haunt Apple?, CNET NEWS.COM,
http://news.cnet.com/drm-free-itunes-store-to-haunt-apple/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2009) (ob-
serving that Amazon.com has been making inroads in the digital online music business).
234. See Rosch, supra note 232, at 977.
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standing in the way of iTMS's competitors selling content to iPod owners
or of the iPod's competitors selling digital music devices to those who
prefer to buy their content from iTMS.
Even if the recent DRM-free development had not occurred and iPod/
iTunes was still a closed system, it is highly doubtful that the iPod/iTMS
monopoly would have been very enduring. The markets for digital music
players and online music are still far from mature, in contrast to the mar-
ket for personal computers. 235 An immature market means that there are
still numerous consumers not yet "locked in" to Apple's iPod/iTune sys-
tem. Even in a closed system, if an iPod competitor produces an innova-
tive and superior digital music player, success is not improbable since the
competitor may compete without much handicap for the untapped mar-
ket, especially for those users who want the device primarily to listen to
their own CD collection "on the go," rather than to purchase songs digi-
tally. If an alternative digital music player catches on, one would expect
other online music services to emerge to provide content, either using an
open encryption standard or developing its own proprietary one. Either
way, inter-system competition would have been more feasible with the
iPod/iTMS than with Microsoft's operating systems, undermining a major
rationale for the essential facilities doctrine. Thus, factual distinctions
support different perspectives of the doctrine as it relates to Microsoft
and the iPod/iTunes situation.
Additionally, lessons drawn from traditional U.S. essential facilities
cases provide a theoretical basis for different treatment. First, in contrast
to Microsoft, it is very difficult to argue that the iPod, iTMS, or FairPlay
are natural monopolies. While there are always costs involved in re-
search and development, economies of scale on the supply side are simply
not so large that the market cannot support competitors for these Apple
products. There are, in fact, a number of alternative digital music devices
on the market-for example, Microsoft's "Zune," 236 and devices from
Toshiba, Sony, and SanDisk 237-though consumers apparently have not
found them as attractive as iPods, at least not yet. Other encryption tech-
nologies, both proprietary and open, also exist.2 38 As for iTMS, it relies
on licensing agreements with music labels for its "products," something
that other firms can just as easily do without incurring significant fixed
costs. In short, the iPod/iTunes system has no discernable natural monop-
oly characteristics.
Second, while the iPod, iTunes, and various iPod accessories-such as
speakers, and docking stations-can be described as a network that gen-
erates network effects, the effects are not sufficiently substantial to create
235. See id. (noting that the market for portable digital music players is still in its in-
fancy and that many consumers have not yet purchased such a device).
236. See Harrang, supra note 228, at 43.
237. See Rosch, supra note 232, at 977.
238. Microsoft's Zune is a closed-system device which uses proprietary encryption, just
as the iPod/iTunes system. However, Microsoft has also created an open encryption tech-
nology, called "PlaysForSure." See Harrang, supra note 228, at 34, 43.
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durable entry barriers that should be of antitrust concern. It is true that,
as the iPod grew in popularity, more and more gadgets were developed
for it, but by far the most important "complement" for any digital music
player is content. Since music labels can easily sign licensing agreements
with additional online digital music stores without incurring much costs
(other than the usual transaction costs), and they have done so, the popu-
larity of the iPod does not create a "content" barrier to entry. This is in
contrast to the large network effects observed in Microsoft, where porting
applications from Windows to other operating systems is so expensive
that software developers are generally willing to write applications only
for Windows, and not for other operating systems with fewer users.239
There is no similar impediment in the online digital music market-there
are no apparent reasons why music labels would be reluctant to enter into
licensing agreements with other online music stores. Therefore, any neg-
ative network effects attributable to the iPod system should be relatively
mild.
It is true that, were it not for the recent DRM-free development, and as
iPod users accumulate content downloaded from iTMS, switching costs
could be a consideration when consumers choose their replacement digi-
tal music player.2 40 Theoretically, to avoid losing their investment in the
content already purchased from iTMS, consumers could possibly become
"locked in" to iPods, even if they prefer a superior alternative. And, path
dependency could result, leading to an entrenchment of the iPod and
iTMS that is unrelated to the inherent quality of these products.
The evolution of various consumer products, however, suggests that
this concern should not be overstated. Common experience informs us
that markets for many consumer goods tend to be highly competitive and
their network effects not very durable. There is a history of users switch-
ing to new, superior, consumer good "systems" as they become available,
despite having invested in an established system. For example, despite
the millions of record albums that music lovers around the world had
accumulated for use with record players over the years, compact discs
and compact disc players had little trouble entering the audio market in
the 1980s, ultimately displacing albums and turntables. DVD players and
DVDs, likewise, succeeded in replacing VHS players in the last decade,
despite the large number of VHS videotapes consumers had already pur-
chased or recorded and that video rental stores had on inventory. Other
examples abound.2 41
239. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 52 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
240. See Harrang, supra note 228, at 40 (noting that opponents of DRM formatted
downloads argue that they restrict consumers' ability to buy a different brand of digital
music player as replacement because they would not then be able to use their existing
music library).
241. For example, the eight-track tapes replaced the old tape recorders in the early
1970s. The eight-track tapes were then subsequently replaced by cassette players. Today,




Where network effects are weak, there should be less concern about
the economic impact of refusals to supply interoperability information.
That is because weak network effects do not create or maintain strong
entry barriers that preserve the monopolist's dominance in the relevant
market. With weak network effects, it is easier for a new entrant to erode
a monopolist's market power through the normal competitive process-
for example, by introducing innovative products at attractive prices. To
the extent that normal competition is possible, the case for applying es-
sential facilities to impose a duty to license one's intellectual property
rights to rivals is much weaker. Recent market changes in the music in-
dustry leading to voluntary changes in the iPod/iTMS business model, in
fact, prove this point.
Finally, unlike Windows, which is the gateway to personal computers
and, hence, a modern-day necessity, the iPod/iTunes system is primarily a
portable personal entertainment device for consumers. Most consumers
would undoubtedly prefer an open system where iPod users could conve-
niently purchase and download content from any online music store, and
owners of other digital music devices could purchase and download con-
tent from iTMS. But, even monopolists generally have the right to
choose their own business model and to keep their own assets to them-
selves, especially if they are protected by patent, copyright, or trade se-
cret laws. Antitrust law must take into account these rights and make
exceptions only in unusual circumstances, such as when denying access is
socially wasteful and impacts the public interest. Apple's iPod/iTunes sit-
uation does not seem to fit within these parameters-it bears more re-
semblance to Aspen Skiing with its lack of any significant public interest
attribute than to Microsoft, or to Terminal Railroad, Otter Tail, MCI, and
Associated Press for that matter. Though the iPod/iTunes business model
before January 2009 also involved a refusal to supply interoperability in-
formation, any parallels drawn to Microsoft Windows seem superficial.
The closed music model may well be an unwise business decision on the
part of Apple, but that is a non-antitrust issue that cannot, on its own, call
for an antitrust solution.
V. ADDRESSING CRITICISMS
Returning to a broader issue concerning essential facilities, many com-
mentators have severely criticized the doctrine on several fronts.242 The
critique that it lacks sound theoretical grounding has already been ad-
dressed.243 Another line of argument often heard is that refusals to deal
have no real adverse economic impact and, therefore, application of the
doctrine would not improve consumer welfare. 244 The most complex ob-
242. See supra note 10.
243. See supra Parts III.A & B.
244. See, e.g., AREEDA & HOVENKAM, supra note 10, 1 771b (using an example to
argue that forcing a monopolist to share a facility does not make consumers better off
absent judicial oversight of prices); Hylton, supra note 10, at 1252 (using an example to
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jection focuses on incentives-critics argue that the doctrine could have a
disincentive effect on innovation, particularly when intellectual property
is involved. 245 This Part will address these last two criticisms.
A. THE "No ADVERSE ECONOMIC EFFECT" CLAIM
An important rationale for the essential facilities doctrine is that it is
bad policy to allow monopolists in control of a critical asset to leverage
their monopoly power in one market into adjacent markets by denying
rivals in adjacent markets access to that critical asset.246 Some commen-
tators, however, claim that increasing competition through access cannot
improve consumer welfare and, therefore, the rationale is flawed.2 47 This
argument is based on the so-called "single monopoly profit theory" ad-
vanced by the Chicago School. 248 The theory posits that only a single
monopoly profit can be made in the sale of a product and its comple-
ment.249 If a monopolist in one market cannot hope to gain additional
monopoly profits by dominating the complement as well, any attempt by
the monopolist in the first market to control the complementary market
must have been undertaken for efficiency reasons. 250 In any event, the
argument continues, there is no cause for antitrust intervention since con-
sumers are no worse off.
illustrate that compelling access may simply result in a redistribution of monopoly profits
between the owner of the facility and its rival); David J. Gerber, Note, Rethinking the
Monopolist's Duty to Deal: A Legal and Economic Critique of the Doctrine of "Essential
Facilities," 74 VA. L. REV. 1069, 1084 (1988).
245. See, e.g., AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, 1 773e; Mats A. Bergman, The
Role of the Essential Facilities Doctrine, 46 ANTITRUST BULL. 403, 421-22 (2001); Lipsky &
Sidak, supra note 10, at 1219; Marquardt & Leddy, supra note 181, at 863; McGowan,
supra note 10, at 804-06 (1996); Werden, supra note 10, at 473.
246. See, e.g., Nicholas Economides & William N. Hebert, Patents and Antitrust. Appli-
cation to Adjacent Markets 462-63 (NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 07-33,
2008), available at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/Economides-Hebert-Patents-and_
Antitrust.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2009) (arguing, based on economic theory, that it is
inappropriate to shield patent holders from antitrust liability when they extend their patent
monopolies into adjacent markets that depend on the interface with the patented product).
247. See supra note 246.
248. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTrTRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH IT-
SELF 372-75 (1978) (arguing that the leverage theory should not be a basis for antitrust
liability because the extension of monopoly power to complementary markets cannot pos-
sibly be harmful to competition); Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Lever-
age Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19, 20, 25-27 (1957) (asserting that if, as assumed, a monopolist
is already maximizing his profits on the sale of the primary (tying) product, a tying arrange-
ment forcing the buyer to purchase a secondary (tied) product would not produce addi-
tional monopoly effect); Aaron Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future: Trade
Regulation, 51 Nw. U. L. REV. 281, 290 (1956) (first introducing the theory).
249. The explanation for this theory goes like this: Suppose firm A has a monopoly in
the bolt market but not in the nut market. The user of nuts and bolts has no use for one
without the other, and therefore values the product as a "package" (e.g., $1 per bolt-nut
set), but is indifferent as to the price of each component. Suppose further that the compet-
itive price of nuts is $0.10. We would then expect the monopolist in the bolt market, A, to
charge the profit maximizing price of $0.90 per bolt. Even if A successfully leverages its
dominance in the bolt market into the nut market, it would still be able to charge only $1
for the nut-bolt "package." A, then, cannot raise the price of nuts without lowering the
price of bolts.
250. See Bowman, supra note 248, at 20, 25-27.
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Economists now generally agree that the single monopoly profit theory
holds only in very limited circumstances. 251 For the theory to be correct,
buyers must need the two related products in fixed proportions, which is
a rare occurrence. 252 Consequently, in most cases involving monopoly
leveraging claims, there is no validity to the assumption that consumers
are unaffected, regardless of whether the monopolist in one market man-
ages to exclude competition in secondary markets.
A further related contention is that application of the doctrine cannot
possibly improve consumer welfare because antitrust law does not bar a
monopolist from charging rivals supracompetitive prices for access.253
Because rivals are likely to pass on their higher costs (due to having to
pay monopoly fees for access), consumers would ultimately pay as much
for the complement, with or without competition from rivals. 254 Since
access will not result in lower prices, the argument continues, output of
the complement will remain the same. The only difference is that, with
access, sales and profits will be shared among the monopolist and its ri-
vals, instead of accruing only to the monopolist.255 How sales and profits
are divided is not considered an economic concern and, therefore, the
essential facilities doctrine, in granting access, serves no economic
purpose.
The problem with this seemingly elegant argument is that it assumes
that markets are static and that price and output are the only measures of
consumer welfare. But, with complex goods and services, the assumption
that markets are static is highly questionable. Moreover, there is more to
consumer benefit than reduced prices and increased output. Even assum-
ing that price competition is infeasible, due to the monopolist's control
over price of the essential "facility," competition based on quality and
innovation remains possible. And quality improvement is a consumer
benefit in its own right, even if total output does not increase. Competi-
tion in train service that results in cleaner railcars and better customer
service, for example, enhances consumer welfare, regardless of whether it
also reduces fares and increases total ridership.
Moreover, the assumption that total output will not increase so long as
prices remain the same is dubious. Innovation and quality improvement
as a result of competition can increase total output, even if prices remain
251. See Economides & Hebert, supra note 246, at 465 n.39 (explaining the limited
circumstance when the single monopoly profit would be correct); Louis Kaplow, Extension
of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 525-38 (1985) (contending
that leveraging can be anticompetitive); Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, An-
ticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J.
209, 289-93 (1986) (same).
252. See supra note 251.
253. Section 2 of the Sherman Act, unlike Article 82 of the E.C. Treaty, does not pro-
hibit a monopolist from charging a monopoly price. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
254. See supra note 244.
255. See, e.g., E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, POL-
ICY AND PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 703 (5th ed. 2003) ("[Florced shar-
ing does not improve the welfare of consumers, it only makes room for another firm in the
market."); supra note 244.
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at the same level, because an improved and more innovative product or
service may attract more buyers into the market. By providing a more
pleasant ride or on-time service, for example, a commuter railroad
granted access to the tracks by an incumbent might attract new commut-
ers who would otherwise not ride the train at all, even without reduction
in fares. The argument that the essential facilities doctrine would not
make any difference to consumers is, therefore, unpersuasive, even from
a purely economic perspective.
Access also has the potential of increasing the variety of available com-
plements, as rivals attempt to differentiate their offerings from those of
the monopolist. It may spur more innovation and improvement on the
part of the monopolist as well, as the monopolist responds to competition
made possible by open access. In short, unless the market is static, and
most markets are not, consumers often do gain from application of the
essential facilities doctrine.
B. INCENTIVE ISSUES AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS
Some critics also contend that the essential facilities doctrine reduces
incentives to innovate on the part of both monopolists required to share
their facilities and rivals who benefit from them. 256 Where the "facility"
is intellectual property, they argue, application of the doctrine is particu-
larly problematic because it undermines the very objectives of the intel-
lectual property laws-to promote and reward innovation by granting
exclusivity to innovators.257 Some go so far as to argue that "essential
facilities principles are inherently inconsistent with intellectual property
protection, '2 58 since they compel sharing when the whole point of intel-
lectual property laws is to confer exclusive rights. Some of these con-
cerns, though valid, are exaggerated, especially when sound limiting
principles are in place, as this Article proposes.
1. Tensions with Intellectual Property Laws
No one would disagree that intellectual property is central to the new
economy. 259 Google's and Microsoft's successes, for example, are based
almost entirely on the information they create and not on physical assets.
It is also generally understood that intellectual property laws are de-
256. See supra note 245.
257. See, e.g., Lipsky & Sidak, supra note 10, at 1193, 1219; Marquardt & Leddy, supra
note 181, at 856 ("The search for a competitive advantage is a healthy dynamic driving the
process of innovation and the development of intellectual property. Ideally, innovation by
one company spurs innovation (or other pro-competitive reactions) by rivals in an attempt
to maintain their competitive position. Allowing those rivals to have access to the innova-
tor's intellectual property simply by declaring themselves beaten runs a serious risk of
short-circuiting that dynamic.").
258. Lipsky & Sidak, supra note 10, at 1219.
259. Technology driven innovations clearly drive today's economy and intellectual
property is the core of these innovations. See generally, Hill & Rausch, supra note 3 (pro-
viding economic data on high technology industries).
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signed to address the "public good" problem of intellectual property.260
Public goods are characterized by nonexcludability2 61 and nonrivalrous-
ness:262 that is, absent some form of legal protection, the owner cannot
easily exclude others from "sharing" the property.2 63 If others can, at
will, "take" information that the owner has spent time and money devel-
oping, the owner would have difficulty profiting from her innovation,
which would greatly diminish her incentives to innovate. By granting
owners of intellectual property a limited right of exclusivity, the intellec-
tual property laws aim to remedy this problem and provide sufficient in-
centives for innovation.264
But while some level of intellectual property protection is essential to
encourage innovation, protection also imposes certain social costs. Com-
mentators have observed that "to be intellectually productive, we neces-
sarily borrow and share. '265 Construing too liberally the right of
exclusivity under the intellectual property laws will block the borrowing
and sharing that is part and parcel of the process of creation, invention,
and innovation to a far greater extent than is necessary or desirable.
If the system overcompensates the innovator, the protection may actu-
ally impede innovation by denying competitors (and users) access to
needed information that could serve as building blocks for further pro-
gress. It would also decrease the economic opportunities for potential
follow-on innovators or potential innovators in adjacent markets, which
may lead to less innovation.266 In short, because competition also plays a
role in fostering innovation, overprotection of an intellectual property
holder from competition may perversely result in less, rather than more,
innovation.267
Ideally, the intellectual property system should offer innovators no
more incentives than are necessary to stimulate innovation.268 Unfortu-
260. For a list of some of the literature discussing the public good characteristics of
intellectual property, see Marina Lao, Federalizing Trade Secrets Law in an Information
Economy, 59 OHIo ST. L.J. 1633, 1639-40 nn.38-40 (1998).
261. Nonexcludability means that, absent legal protection, the owner of an invention or
creative work cannot easily exclude others from using it. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
MARK D. JANIS & MARK A. LEMLEY, IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 1-5 (2005).
262. Nonrivalrousness means that one person's use of an invention or creative work
does not encroach on another's ability to use it as well. See, e.g., id.; DENNIS W. CARLTON
& JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 530-31 (4th ed. 2005). For
example, I can use a software application without diminishing your ability to use it.
263. For example, absent copyright protection, I can duplicate a software developer's
new program at little or no cost for personal use or even for distribution to others at a low
price.
264. See Marina Lao, Unilateral Refusals to Sell or License Intellectual Property and the
Antitrust Duty to Deal, 9 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 193, 213-14 (1999).
265. Frischmann & Waller, supra note 11, at 2.
266. See Lao, supra note 264, at 214.
267. See id.
268. See Economides & Hebert, supra note 210, at 464 (contending that it is economi-
cally inefficient and inappropriate to offer more incentive than is necessary to innovators);
Lao, supra note 264, at 213 ("The system protects intellectual property, not because it is
sacrosanct, but because protection promotes innovation and economic growth. Thus, the
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nately, there is no reliable method to assess how much exclusivity and
protection from competition is optimal for innovation. 269 Nor is there
any reasonably accurate method to determine how much competition, as
opposed to intellectual property laws, contributes to innovation.2 70 But
there is certainly no evidence to suggest that the greater the scope of
intellectual property protection, the higher the rate of innovation.
Today, many commentators believe that "[i]ntellectual property law is
out of control, '2 71 with the boundaries of the law being stretched to ex-
pand the rights for intellectual property holders, leading to higher costs
for users.272 Of course, it is not the prerogative of antitrust law to directly
challenge the explicit statutory protections of the federal intellectual
property system, even if we deem the protection unwise in a specific con-
text.2 73 For example, even a monopolist could not be compelled under
antitrust law to allow others to duplicate its copyrighted source code in
order to introduce a clone (unless it has misused its copyright), no matter
how beneficial that might be to consumer welfare, because to do so would
directly conflict with a specific right granted in the Copyright Act. 274
Though antitrust law obviously cannot and should not be applied in a
manner that actually conflicts with intellectual property laws, it does not
follow that intellectual property rights holders have near-absolute anti-
trust immunity. It is well-established, for example, that antitrust law pro-
hibits illegal tying arrangements involving patents and copyrights to the
same extent that it prohibits ordinary tying arrangements. 27 5 Several
courts have also recognized that refusals by a monopolist intellectual
protection afforded by the intellectual property laws should only be broad enough to carry
out the objective of stimulating innovation.").
269. See Lao, supra note 264, at 214-15 (discussing theoretical tests designed to find the
proper balance and arguing that they are indeterminate).
270. See id. at 215-16 (arguing that competition itself is a strong impetus for
innovation).
271. Harry First, Controlling the Intellectual Property Grab: Protect Innovation, Not In-
novators, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 365, 365 (2007).
272. See id.; Lao, supra note 264, at 213-21 (questioning the wisdom of overlooking
potential drawbacks of overly expansive intellectual property protection, and of undervalu-
ing both the role of competition in stimulating innovation and the importance of competi-
tion in its own right); see generally Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and
Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031 (2005) (criticizing the trend toward broad interpretation
of intellectual property rights).
273. The patent and copyright laws were passed pursuant to Article I, § 8 of the U.S.
Constitution, which grants Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
274. The Copyright Act grants a copyright owner an exclusive right to reproduce the
copyrighted work and otherwise exploit the work for a specified period of time. 17 U.S.C.
§ 106 (2006). Similarly, the Patent Act expressly confers on a patent holder an exclusive
right to use or otherwise exploit its invention and to exclude others from the field claimed
by the invention for a limited time. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000); 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000 & Supp.
V 2007).
275. See, e.g., United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); United States v. Para-
mount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948); Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392
(1947); Morton Salt, Co. v. G.S. Suppiger, Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942); Motion Picture Patents
Co. v. Universal Film Mfg., Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
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property holder to license or sell its intellectual property to rivals in de-
rivative markets (in order to leverage its monopoly power from one mar-
ket into another) can give rise to antitrust liability.276
More recently, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also made
abundantly clear in Microsoft that the Copyright Act does not give copy-
right owners, such as Microsoft, the right to control all aspects of their
protected works. 277 Microsoft had asserted that its copyright of Windows
gave it the right to license the product on terms it saw fit, and that "if
intellectual property rights have been lawfully acquired ... , their subse-
quent exercise cannot give rise to antitrust liability. '278 The court dis-
missed this argument out of hand as "border[ing] upon the frivolous. 279
Case law and policy reasons, then, both support a position that mini-
mizes the finding of true conflict between antitrust and intellectual prop-
erty laws, which would require immunity from antitrust.280 True,
Microsoft cannot be directed to license its Windows source code to poten-
tial rivals to make possible a duplicate product, since that would consti-
tute a direct conflict with the Copyright Act. However, the intellectual
property laws do not entitle Microsoft to control all aspects of Windows,
such as refusing to disclose the software's interface information, in order
to leverage its power in Windows into adjacent markets. 281 And, applying
the essential facilities doctrine to compel the licensing of interoperability
information in this context would not conflict with the specific protec-
tions of intellectual property laws.
2. Incentives to Innovate and Reward for Innovation
Even without a direct conflict with intellectual property laws, some
critics object to the essential facilities doctrine on grounds that it gener-
ally reduces the incentives for, and hence chills, innovation, 282 which is
particularly troubling when intellectual property rights are implicated.
283
The thrust of their argument is that the purpose of intellectual property
law is to offer incentives for innovation by granting exclusivity to intellec-
tual property rights owners. This argument also applies outside the intel-
276. See supra Part III-C.
277. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 62-63 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
278. Brief of Appellant at 105, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (Nos. 00-5212 & 5213).
279. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 63.
280. See First, supra note 219, at 1419 (proposing that "[c]ourts should minimize the
conflict between intellectual property and antitrust by carefully examining the intellectual
property rights being asserted").
281. See id. (arguing that antitrust immunity should go no further than necessary and
should extend only to the scope of the intellectual property right).
282. See, e.g., AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, 1 772c2 (contending that impos-
ing "any duty to share [intellectual property] would reduce the incentives for it and there-
fore tend to chill that desirable activity").
283. See, e.g., Lipsky & Sidak, supra note 10, at 1219 (arguing that the essential facilities
doctrine is inconsistent with "the policies of patent, copyright, and other kindred legal
systems"); Marquardt & Leddy, supra note 181, at 864 ("At a minimum, application of the
essential facilities doctrine to compel the sharing of intellectual property must be done, if
at all, in a way that does not undermine the core goals of intellectual property rights.").
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lectual property area: building a bridge across the Mississippi would be
the kind of innovation (whether or not technological in nature) that ar-
guably would be retarded by the fear that the benefits reaped could be
taken away by a court under the antitrust laws. By imposing a duty to
share, the doctrine is said to undermine the objective of encouraging in-
novation because it prevents the monopolist from fully appropriating the
rewards.
Critics express concern that dominant firms, knowing that they might
be forced to share their advantage with rivals, would be less inclined to
invest in creating the "facility" in the first place.2 84 Rivals who stand to
benefit from application of the doctrine may also have less incentive to
innovate-to find a way around the obstacle of the bottleneck-because
they no longer have the need to do so. 285
The issue of incentives is, in fact, much more complex than is suggested
by critics. Their arguments focus primarily on the interests of intellectual
property holders and their desire to extract maximum reward for their
efforts.286 There appears to be an assumption that any legal rule having
some disincentive effect on innovation on the part of a monopolist intel-
lectual property holder would necessarily be harmful to the economy and,
therefore, unacceptable. That assumption, however, is unsubstantiated.
In any calculus of the effects on innovation of compulsory access, it is
not enough to consider only the possible disincentive effect on the mo-
nopolist forced to share its facility. The stimulus to innovation brought
about by mandatory disclosure or sharing, especially in complementary
markets, must also be taken into account. By giving rivals that which is
needed to compete in complementary markets, essential facilities may
unleash innovation and competition in the complementary markets. 287
The essential facilities doctrine, as limited by the principles proposed
here, is more likely to have a net positive effect on innovation than a net
negative effect, at least in network industries with strong network ef-
fects.288 That is because strong network effects usually reflect a winner-
take-all or winner-take-most market. In such markets, the essential facili-
ties doctrine should increase, not decrease, net innovation because open-
ing access would encourage innovation from smaller rivals in the
secondary markets. At the same time, the reduction in total reward to
the innovator is unlikely to unduly deter monopolists required to share
284. See Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
407-08 (2004).
285. Id. at 407.
286. Id.
287. See Lao, supra note 227, at 215-18 (arguing that competition itself is a strong stim-
ulus to innovation and that expansive intellectual property protection may diminish, rather
than enhance, innovation in complementary markets).
288. See Jonathan B. Baker, Promoting Innovation Competition Through the Aspen/
Kodak Rule, 7 GEO. MASON L. REv. 495, 511-15 (1999) (persuasively arguing that in win-
ner-take-all markets, a policy preventing dominant firm exclusion of fringe firms should
increase net innovation, by encouraging fringe firm innovation while not deterring too
much dominant firm innovation efforts).
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the essential facility because of the attraction of the potential large win-
ner-take-all prize.289
The suggestion that any limitation of a monopolist's reward would dis-
courage development of the facility in the first place 290 is unsupported by
economic studies or other evidence. It also seems to ignore the common
sense reality that, while firms would always like maximum profits, even
monopolists could be content with less, provided that the returns are suf-
ficient to justify the investment and risk taking. Since, by definition, the
doctrine is applicable only when the alleged essential facility is in the
hands of a monopolist in a relevant market, the monopolist may well
have already reaped sufficient profits in that market to justify the innova-
tion. While control of a secondary market would add to the reward and
would certainly be welcomed, the absence of that control would likely not
have changed the monopolist's action ex ante. It would be absurd, for
example, to speculate that Microsoft would have been discouraged from
investing in Windows had it known that it would not be permitted to cor-
ner the server market as well by refusing to license interoperability infor-
mation to Sun Microsystems and others.
Moreover, it bears noting that the essential facilities doctrine does not
call for uncompensated sharing.291 In fact, dominant firms are usually
allowed to charge monopoly prices, so long as they are non-discrimina-
tory, unless the court orders otherwise. 292 Given all these considerations,
the argument that the essential facilities doctrine, applied cautiously in
accordance with the principles discussed here, would somehow over-deter
innovation and undermine the policies of intellectual property protection
is unpersuasive.
Equally unpersuasive is the contention that the doctrine would also dis-
courage innovation on the part of competitors given access to the facility.
The MCI test itself already ensures that the essential facilities argument
would fail unless the facility is shown to be truly essential. Furthermore,
the natural monopoly characteristics of the "essential facilities" suggest
that recreating the facility would be socially wasteful, undesirable, and
should not be undertaken. The presence of significant network effects in
the affected network industry also means that inter-system competition is
unlikely to be successful, which cuts against the argument that, but for
open access, rivals could have developed an alternative network to en-
gage in inter-system competition.
289. See id. at 514-15.
290. See Marquardt & Leddy, supra note 181, at 856 (contending that allowing rivals to
have access to the innovator's creation would upset the dynamic built into the intellectual
property system for "innovation by one company [to] spur[ ] innovation").
291. In none of the essential facilities cases was the defendant ordered to grant uncom-
pensated access to its facility.
292. If liability is proven, courts may require the monopolist to sell or grant access at
the competitive price. However, this would place courts in the position of being a central




With sound limiting principles, the essential facilities doctrine can be an
effective tool for courts and antitrust institutions to remedy interoper-
ability and access problems so often seen in modern day networks. A
common refrain in the criticism of the doctrine has been that it lacks the-
oretical grounding or even a consistent rationale. A reexamination of the
important U.S. essential facilities cases shows that that is not true. There
are in fact sound, though perhaps unarticulated, principles underlying
each of those cases.
U.S. courts have, by and large, decided the essential facilities cases sen-
sibly: they have tended to condemn a monopolist's refusal to share its
"essential facility" when the facility had natural monopoly characteristics
or strong network effects, and the good or service involved was a neces-
sity, and they have declined to do so when these features were absent.
That is, they have usually approved of the doctrine only when the denial
of access was, or would have been, socially wasteful, impeded innovation
and competition, and adversely impacted the public interest. These same
principles can be applied equally well to refusals to license information
needed for interoperability in networks to help identify when compulsory
disclosure might be an appropriate solution and when it might not.
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